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ABSTRACT 
A CRITIQUE OF THE ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE ON THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS, 8 JULY 1996. THE "NUCLEAR WEAPONS CASE". 
The General Assembly of the United Nations, by Resolution, requested the 
International Court of Justice to give its Advisory Opinion on the following legal 
question: 
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
intemational/aw? 
The question raises a number of legal, political and moral issues which go to the 
heart of the development of public international Iuw, and of relations between States in 
the United Nations era. 
Central to all such issues is the tension, both legal and political, which exists 
between the five declared nuclear weapon States (the Pemmnent Members of the United 
Nations Security Council) and most non-nuclear weapon States. Essentially, the latter 
take the view that the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be illegal in all 
circumstances, largely in terms of the humanitarian laws of armed conflict. The former 
insist that, in the absence of specific prohibitior::, nuclear weapons are not illegal in all 
foreseeable circumstances. 
This dichotomy has been institutionalised in the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty, which solidified the discriminatory treatment accorded to nuclear weapons by the 
nuclear weapon States during the Cold War practice of deterrence. 
The nub of the Court's findings was that it was unable to conclude definitively 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme 
circumstances of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake. 
I 
I 
VI 
This thesis examines, in five Chapters, the legal and political background to the 
Case, the text of the Opinion, and the evidence and argument led by States. It evaluates 
the Opinion in terms of the Dissenting and other Opinions of individual judges of the 
Court, its dicta, and the coherence of its argument. Finally, it draws conclusions 
concerning the outcomes, relevance and impact of the. Opinion for the judicial 
independence and integrity of the Court; nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation and 
disarmament; principles of self-defence in international law; and a rights-based approach 
to international relations and law. 
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FOREWORD. 
The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons, 1 given in response to United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 49/75 K and handed down on 8 July 1996, was the culmination of several years 
of activity at both State and Non-Governmental Organisaton (NGO) levels around the world. 
From an unpromising beginning in the form of private representations to the 
Governments of New Zealand and Australia in 1987, NOD activity aimed at obtaining a 
General Assembly "Request for Opinion" Resolution intensified rapidly, especially in the 
work of three large international bodies: the International Physicians for the Prcver1tion of 
Nuclear War ( IPPN), the IntcrnaLional Peace Bureau (IPB) and the International Association 
of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms ( !ALANA). 
These organisations initiated a global alliance of over 700 NGOs, known as the 
"World Court Project", which played a leading role in the sponsorship and adoption of the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution referred to above. The Draft Resolution, 
sponsored by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement of States, was passed by a 
vote of 78 in favour, 43 against, with 38 abstentions on 15 December I 994.2 
A total of 43 States made written statem;::nts and oral submissions in the course of 
Pleadings before the Court, far greater than any previous case. 
' 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996). 
2 Draft Resolution NC. 1/49L.36.International Court of Justice., The Hague, Netherlands. 23 December !994 
[Communique No. 94/24]. 
A similar question was put to the Court by Resolution of the Forty-sixth World Health Assembly of the World 
Health Organisation, a specialised Agency of the United Nations: 
In view oft he heahh and environmental effects, would the usc of nuclear weapons by a State 
in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including 
the WHO Constitution? (Resolution 46/40, of 14 May 1993). 
The Court declined to consider the request of the WHO, having regard for its jurisdiction in terms of Article 65 
of its Statute, a component of the Charter of the TJnitcd Nations. 
2 
This thesis comprises a critique of the Court's Advisory Opinion in tenns of the 
evidence of fact, and the law before it. By reviewing the strength of both (their relevance, 
inte :pretation and application to the question posed) it will assess the arguments led on both 
sides, and draw the-:;~:- together in order to evaluate the Court's ratio decidendi. 
Further, it will examine a range of possible effects and implications of the Opinion 
for the development of international law, while attempting, with respect, to indicate the 
circumstances from which it may he possible to impute a level of extra-juridicaJ influence 
upon the Court which tends to call into question its standing as an international tribunal, and 
as an independent institution within the United Nations system. 
With this in mind, it must be stated at the outset that this thesis takes the general 
position that the Court erred in its dispasitif, at least to the extent of its finding of non·liquet 
on elements of fact, and of law available to it? 
There can be little doubt that this Opinion, by far the largest matter ever brought 
before the International Court of Justice, is also one of its most important. As a signal 
example of the values assigned by the international community to the Court's jurisprudence, 
the Opinion highlights the dual realities of its judicial and political roles. 
The wide divergence of views surrounding the interpretation of international law, 
evident in the Pleadings by States before Jt, is reflected in the individual Opinions of Judges 
on the Court's Bench. The Advisory Opinion stands as a sobering affirmation of the need to 
continue efforts to develop a positive Law of Nations which is capable of support from the 
entire international community. 
l See Chapter II, Section2.1, for the text of the Court's dispositif. 
3 
CHAPTER I. 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
In order to develop a coherent and comprehensive critique of the Advisory Opinion, 
and one which takes account of both its legal and political contexts, it is necessary to draw 
together the threads of the evolution of public international law within the United Nations 
system since its inception in 1945, and to place I he International Court of Justice within that 
frame. 1 In doing so, it is essential to review the development of the international geo-
political system of States since that time, in the context of alternative theoretical analyses of 
the international system of relations between them. 
An understanding of the juxtaposition and interdependence of these two fields of 
international affairs is vital to an integrated judgment of the tasks which the international 
community expects its "World Court" to perform, and of the Court's success in discharging 
its duties. 
2. STATEMENT OF AIMS. 
The thesis has the following aims: 
1. To examine critically the Advisory Opinion of the Court in respect of its 
jurisprudential coherence, having regard for: 
1 The time-frame referred to here includes the transitional period which the international system has now 
entered following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold Wc.r, both of which began 
during 1989. Wiener has asserted that the continued international leadership of the United States is central to 
the question of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the "new world disorder" of diffuse axes of power and 
lack of direction. He also quotes former U.S. President !lush, stating before ConpTess on ll September !990 
that "we are 1ww in .¥ight of a United Nations which performs as envi.rioned by its founders", and in January 
1991 that: "we are the m1ly nation on thi.r earth that could assemble the forces of peace. This is the burden of 
leader.~hip". Wiener, J. (1995). Leadership, the United Nations, and the New World Order. In D. Bourantonis 
& 1. Wiener (Eds.), The United Nations in the New World Order (pp. 41-63). Hound mills: Macmillan. 
4 
(a). The argument and evidence led and adduced before it by States; 
(b). Its identification and interpretation of relevant law and evidence of fact from the 
corpus both of law and of evidence available to it. 
2. To undertake a comprehensive review of all sources of international law in order 
to identify those relevant to the question posed by the General Assembly Resolution. 
3. To ascertain the extent of available evidence of fact relevant to the question. 
4. To interpret and apply relevant applicable law, and evidence of fact, in order to 
draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the Court's Opinion. 
5. To examine, analyse and interpret the geo~political context in which the Advisory 
Opinion has been given, and the range of possible effects and implications of the Opinion in 
terms of the future course of international law, geo-political relationships, and nuclear 
disarmament. 
6. To reach general and specific conclusions summarising the legal and political 
positions on both sides of the question, and defend the final position of the thesis. 
3. THE GENESIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. 
Modem public international law may be said to have had its genesis in the 
constitution of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco in 1945.2 From that point on, 
international law has been progressively codified through an increasingly complex matrix of 
conventional instruments, such as Covenants, Conventions, bilateral and multi-lateral 
2 The San Francisco Conference adopted the Charter, together with the Statute of the lntemational Court of 
Justice, on 26 June 1945. Both came into force on 24 October 1945, and the first Session of the Court took 
place in The Hague from 6 April to 6 May 1946. Eyfffinger, A. (1995) The lmemational Court of Justice. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, at pp. 98, 99. 
5 
Treaties, and other agreements and Declarations, which modify, extend and are declaratory 
of the customary international law, and "general principles of law"3 which have mediated 
relations between Western nations since ancient times.4 
It is necessary here to emphasise that this fonn of public international law, 
understood traditionally as the product of the European mind, and having its modern origins 
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century work of scholars such as Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius 
and Hobbes/; represents only one part of a rich, world-wide landscape of legal traditions 
founded on religious, social, ethical and cultural structures. 6 Its arena was the European 
system of nation-States which had been developing in the century before the 1648 Pact of 
Westphalia,7 and it served from that time as a unifying force within Europe, in the absence of 
centralised political authority. 8 
Such a secularised, "Enlightened" legal system9 contrasted sharply with others 
throughout the world. In Asia, the Vedic law traditions of Hinduism had greatly influenced 
the "inter-state" law of South and Southeast Asia from around 1500 BC, 10 as had the 
Buddhist world view, beginn:ng a full millenium later. 11 The international law of the Muslim 
world presented a further distinction from Euro-centric legal traditions, founded as it was on 
the religious teachings of the Prophet Mohammed in the Seventh century, and embodied in 
.l Article 38 (I) of the Stalutc of the Intcrnalional Court of Justice defines such principles, at sub-paragraph c., 
as "the general principles of law recognised hy civilised nations''. Harris, D. J. ( 1991 ). Cases and materials on 
international law (3rd rev. ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p.998. Refer to Appendix 2. 
4 Eyffinger, Chief Librarian in the Court's Registry (1996), provides an overview of the development of 
international law from its European genesis in the century leading up to the Peace of We.rtphalia of 1648, 
during which the modern Stale syslem became established, to the present day. Loc. cit. at Note 2 above, pp. 4-
14. 
5 Ibid. The humanist Jegfll scholflr Hugo Grotius, who has long been considered one of the founders of 
international law, solidified the form of a Euro-centric public international law in his seminal work De jure belli 
ac pacis ("The laws of war and peace") of 1625. His works were based on the notion that the core of 
civilisation was founded on the cumulation, repelition and synthesis of the works of prominent minds from all 
ages, which constituted its intellectual legacy and the essence of human conscience. At p.14. 
6 Ibid, Ch. 8. A detailed, but somewhat arbitrary categorisation of world legal systems includes their European, 
Asian, Islamic, Latin American and African components. 
1 Ibid, p. 184. The Pact of Watphalia established the sovereign independence, territorial integrity and equality 
of States, while establishing instruments of diplomacy for the resolution of disputes within the doctrine of 
bellum iustum, or "just war". 
8 Ibid, p. 10. 
9 Ibid p.9. The Reformation ethos which rejecled the moral theology and religious bonds of the Church formed 
the foundation of the secular, positivist formulation of international law, as propounded by Grotius. 
10 Ibid, p.203. 
11 /bid, p.208. Unlike the secular international law of the European tradition, the international law traditions of 
many Asian regions arc rooted finnly in religious faith and social organisation. 
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the Qur'an. 12 Further distinctive international legal systems are represented by the vast 
complexity of pre-colonial social structures in Latin America and Africa, and their effects on 
the ways in which the post-colonia1 States of these regions have been incorporated into the 
modern (post-1945) international legal and political regimes.n 
It is clear, then, that international law, as it developed under the aegis of the United 
Nation~ system after the Second World War, could not rely for its philosophical and 
intellectual foundations solely on the European legal tradition if it was to reflect the 
religious, social or cultural needs of States widely differentiated in these spheres. 14 
For this reason, the International Court of Justice, "an intrinsic part of the UN 
Organisation [and} ... the cornerstone of a multi-faceted structure of dispute settlement" 15 is 
constituted to take account of, and represent, the principle legal systems of the world. 
Since 1987, the distribution of appointments to the fifteen seats on the Bench of the 
Court has been as follows: the "Western" group of States (Western Europe, the United 
Kingdom, the "Old Commonwealth"16 and the United States): 5 seats; the {exJ Socialist 
States of the fanner Soviet bloc: 2 scats; the Afro-Asian group: 6 seats (African and Asian 
States each with 3 seats), with one seat each to Latin America and the Caribbean region. 17 
Any such distribution can probably never avoid controversy based on perceptions of 
relative political influence between States, but it appears, at least superficially, that the 
12/bid, p.221. The predominant position of religious law over secular law in the Islamic world is pervasive. Its 
innuence has been perceived as growing with the rise, in recent years, of Islamic Fundamentalism, and the 
establishment of theocratic States ( in, for example, Irnn since 1979). 
13 Ibid, p.252. Eyffingcr indicates the influence which African members of the Court have had in pressing for a 
new and contemporary international law, on~ which rejects the stasis of the past for recognition of the principle 
of progressive development of the Jaw. 
14 The United Nations system nevertheless acknowledges the organisational legacy of the League of Nations 
and the "Versailles System" (notwithstanding its ultimate failure), as docs the I.C.J. to its predecessor, the 
Pennanent Court of International Justice. In particular, the Statute of the Pennancnt Court served as the basis 
for its successor, allowing a large degree of continuity of judicial practice between the two institutions, even 
though the present Court, unlike its predecessor, is an integral organ of the international body. Gill, T. (1989). 
Litigation strategy at the International Court: A case study of the Nicaragrw v. United States dispute. 
Dordrccht Martinus Nijhoff, at pp. 5-9; Singh, N. (1989). The role and record of the Imernational Court of 
Justice. Dordrecht: Marti nus Nijhoff. p.B. 
15 Loc. cit. at Note 2 above, p.2. 
16 The term "Old Commonwealth" is used here to describe those countries which attained responsible 
parliamentary government and Dominion status within the British Empire during the Nineteenth Century. They 
include Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
17 Article 9 of the Statute of the Court provides, inter alia, that the body of members of the Court should 
represent "the main forms of civilisation and of the principle legal systems of the world". Op. cit. at Note 5, 
p.991. Sec Appendix 2. 
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majority of the world's legal, political, economic, social, cultural, ethical and religious 
systems have gained a measure of representation on the Court's Bench. 
4. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW SINCE 1945. 
The history of the development of international law since 1945 can be viewed as an 
analogue of the fundamental changes, discussed below, which have evolved over the past 
fifty years in the geo·political relationships between States. If it can be said to have a 
coherent goal towards which its evolution might be directed, then that articulated by All ott in 
1990 may serve the purpose: 
The new international law will be as dynamic and as rich as the law of any 
subordinate society, organizing human willing and acting in every field which 
concerns the survival and prospering of the society of which it is the law.18 
In contrast with this universalist vision, other writers, such as Green and De 
Visscher, 19 are pessimistic about the ability of the universal rule of international law to serve 
the disparate attitudes and interests of geo-political State groupings. As political realists they 
cannot comprehend a legal regime able to transcend the power of individual States. 
Nevertheless, this is precisely what the Charter of the United Nations seeks to do. As 
the legal and political keystone of the modern era, its dual function gives it the inherent 
strength with which to resist any opposition by States, or other international actors, to the 
overarching system it supports. 
In this role it may be said to gain strength from the overtly positivist tenor of its 
text.:w The clear pronouncement of rights and duties of States, unencumbered by allusion to 
meta-theoretical discourses (such as those concerned with natural rights or virtue)21 places 
18 Cited in Dixon, M. & McCorquodale, R. (1991) Cases and materials on international law. London: 
Blackstone, at p. I I. 
19 Op. cit. at Note 5, p.S. 
20 The Positivist legal tradition can be traced to John Austin, whose seminal I 832 work "TI1e Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined" sought to establish law as a set of rules. Sartorius, R. (1971). Hart's concept of law. 
In RobertS. Summers (Ed.). More essays in legal philosophy (pp. 13 1-161). Oxford: Blackwell. 
21 Two leading works on justice from natural rights, and from virtue arc, respectively: Nozick, R. (1974). 
Anarchy, state and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell; and Mac Intyre, A. (1981). After virtue: a study of moral theory. 
London: Duckworth. 
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the Charter within a long tradition of legal positivist philosophy, and allows its universal 
acceptance as the benchmark against which to measure the behaviour of all actors with 
' ' I I' 22 mtematiOna persona tty. 
The International Court of Justice holds a position of great importance within the 
United Nations system, since its primary function is to analyse and apply the law as it exists 
(lex lata) in order to render clear judgments, and opinions, in accordance with its obligations 
under its Statute (which is itself a part of the UN Charler)?3 
Its function as the pre-eminent legal arbiter of disputes between States, and of all 
aspects of public international law, gives the Court the character of a mediator, or pivot, 
through which turns the dialectic which modifies and develops international law. As it 
arbitrates disputes between States through the discovery, interpretation and application of the 
law, and renders opinions on questions raised by States, the Court reveals, by its published 
deliberations, the degree of its significance for (and influence upon) the rule of law among 
them. 
This is not to deny that the Court suffers from procedural difficulties in the course of 
its jurisprudence. Examples may be taken from customary and conventional sources, or a 
combination of both. The so-called "Optional Clause" (Article 36 (2) of the Court's Statute) 
allows States to declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the 
Court, while sub-paragraph 3 of the same Article allows States to place reciprocal and 
temporal caveats on those declarations.24 In the history of cases before the Court, the 1984 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v United 
22 The San Francisco Conference was able to begin with a tabula rasa, on which it could inscribe a Constitution 
for "We the peoples of the United Nations ... " (in the Preamble of the Charier) which was open for membership 
" ... to all other peace-loving states ... " (Article 4 of the Charter). The term "international personality" refers not 
only to independent sovereign States within the international community, but also to international organisations, 
such as those created by international conventions, and to the United Nations Organismion itself. Certification 
of the existence of such derivative subjects of law is given at: Advisory Opinion on Reparalions for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. 1949 J.C.J.Repor/s 174 at 174, 178-9 and 185. Cited in von 
Glahn, G. (1992). Law among natiom: an introduction /o public illlernational/a\1' (5th rev. cd.).New York: 
Macmillan, at p.l33. See Appendix I. 
23 The competence of the Court is laid down in Chapter 2 of its Statute, in Anicles 34 to 38, and covers such 
matters as: who may selse the Court, the extent of its jurisdiction, continuity with the Pennanent Court's 
competence, and the sources of international law applicable to its jurisprudence. Loc. cit. at Note 5. 
24 Ibid. 
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States of AmericaP5 provides a clear example of the problems which this Article can 
produce.26 
Secondly, the codification of the customary law of treaties m the 1969 Vienna 
Convention 011 the Law of Treaties 27 has introduced a new dimension of certainty (but 
analytical complexity) to the adjudication of disputes turning on the interpretation of rights 
and duties arising from treaty obligations. 28 
A third example of potential for jurisprudential impairment, and one central to this 
thesis, is the practice of Dissenting and Separate Opinions, and individual Declarations, in 
the published decisions of the Court, as provided in Article 57 of the Court's Statute. 
Each has served to circumscribe the jurisprudence of the Court, although Hussain 
points to individual opinions as nothing more than lhe external manifestation of the Court's 
"dialectical process" of judgment in a collegiate setting (surely an overly optimistic view). 
He also sees no possibility of damage to its "moral authority". 29 
The International Court of Justice occupies a central position in the international 
system, from both a legal and a political perspective. Its ability to maintain that position will 
depend on its capacity accurately to modulate the relative weight it should accord in its 
judgments to each of these domains of international affairs. 
2~ 1984/.C.J. Reports 392. Sec Ch. II, Note 22. 
26 In this case, the United States made a Declaration modifying its "Optional Clause" Declaration after realising 
that its dispute with Nicaragua would come before the Court, thus seeking to deny the Court's jurisdiction to 
hear the matter. In the event, it did not succeed because of self-declared time constraints, but the potential for 
manipulation by States of the Court'sjurisdiction is undeniable. Op. cit. at Note 20, p.529. 
27 1155 U.N. T.S. 331. 
28 61 A.J.I.L. 263-463 (1967). As a law-making Treaty, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was 
based on draft Articles produced by the International Law Commission, and represents an example of a 
synthesis of codification and the progressive development of customary international law. Op. cit, at Note 5, 
f·729. 
9 Hussain summarises arguments for and against the practice of allowing Dissenting Opinions in a collegiate 
curial setting. Its opponents are said, unsurprisingly, to decry the perception of its enfeebled solidarity, a "rule 
of minorities" within the Bench, and susceptibility of individual Judges to political pressures. Its supporters are 
cast as champions of judicial pluralism, as envisaged in Article 9 of the Statute of the Court (See Note 8, 
supra). They also assert that Dissenting Opinions ensure greater judicial responsibility, and arc useful obiter 
dicta for understanding majority decisions. Hussain, I. {1984). Dissenting and separate opinions at the World 
Court. Dordrccht: Marti nus Nijhoff, at pp. 2-4, and 73, While not denying the force of these arguments, it 
seems equally open to hold that one compelling reason for the usc of Article 57 is, as J. S. Mill pointed out in 
his 19th Century Utilitarian tracts, that minority-based opposition is better viewed in the cold light of day, and 
required to justify itself, rather than be suppressed. 
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5. INTERNATIONAL GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1945. 
It is in the nature of the human race, as within the natural world, that the rules are 
made by the victors of struggle, and not by the losers; that new turns in the international legal 
road are dete1mined by those with political strength. Such was the case during April -June 
1945 at San Francisco as the fonn and constitution of the United Nations Organisation was 
negotiated,30 by which time it had become clear to the Western Allies, and to the Soviet 
Union, that the Axis Powers would be defeated. 31 The United Nations Charter was 
negotiated, by the fifty nations then comprising the bulk of the international community, on 
the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of 1944 for the establishment of "an international 
organisation for the maintenance of peace and security."32 
The impulse for the Western Allies to seek a new international regime was the failure 
of its predecessor. The twenty year period between the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and the 
beginning of the Second World War was one of insularity, instability, and ultimately of 
breakdown in relations between nation-States. 33 The Treaty itself, in its attempt utterly to 
subdue the German nation and its former allies through military and economic sanctions,34 
contained the seeds of a second, even more devastating world conflict. The idealism inherent 
in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Point Plan" for world peace and stability 
provided a further avenue for complacency, drift and appeasement of aggression in the 
context of isolationism, and deep economic and geo-political dislocation among the Western 
liberal democracies. 35 
)O Refer to Note 2, supra. 
31 While the war in Europe was entering its ftnal stages, Japan showed no sign of an intention to surrender its 
Home Islands. The anticipated f:matical defence of their homeland by the J<~panese people, and the potential 
loss of up to 500,000 US troops has been proposed as the primary reason for President Truman's decision to 
usc nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Yergin, D. H. (1990). Shattered peace: the origins of 
the Cold War. New York: Penguin, at p.ll5. 
32 Op. cit. at Note 2, supra, p.96. 
n Glynn describes the liabilities of liberalism for liberal democracies, and the need for a balance between 
liberalism and foreign policy realism. He describes " ... the arduous path by which liberal societies gradually 
attained a level of realism in foreign affairs, often only to lose sight of it and then be forced by events to recover 
it again". Glynn, P. (1992). Closing Pandora's box: arms races, art11s contra/, and the history of the Cold War. 
New York: BasicBooks. At p. xi. 
34 Ibid, pp. 51~55. 
Jj Ibid, pp. 47-50. The Treaty of Versailles was more armistice (seen by Germany as fundamentnlly unjust) than 
peace treaty. Wilsonian Idealism, and the institution of the League of Nations, were no match for such deeply-
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The victors of San Francisco (all except one of which was, at that time, ignorant of 
the existence of practical and deliverable nuclear weapons) were detennined that the 
outcome of the second conflagration would be a mechanism which could, through the 
codification of international law and the use of institutions for the settlement of disputes, 
ensure that no nation would be able to escape the sanction of the international community. 
The Clausewitzian use of force in international relations, except in the case of self-defence 
(and then only according to strictly delineated rules) was to be consigned to history.36 
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of international relations in the period from 1945 
to the present has been the transfonnation of a Euro-ccntric international system into one of 
global reach and significance.37 
A second fundamental and defining event was the development, prosecution and 
cessation of the "Cold War" between the American and Soviet spheres of influence, and the 
economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union which gathered pace during 1989. The 
bipolar struggle for ascendency between irreconcilable ideological antagonists began in 
earnest in 1949, with the explosion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union. The subsequent 
forty-year balance of terror, epitomised by the United States' strategy of "Mutually Assured 
Destruction", needs no embellishment. 38 
A third event crucial to an understanding of post-war international relations and the 
development of international law, and one which is related to the first, is the dismantling of 
the Asian and African empires of European States, a process which began after 1919, and 
accelerated after 1945. By that time, the metropolitan States of Britain, France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands had lost credibility as colonial hegemons, in consequence of their fortunes in 
war against the Axis Powers. 
held convictions, nor for the effects of the world-wide economic Depression of the 1930s, and political 
instability in Europe. 
36 Ibid, p.l76. The Clauscwitzian Doctrine of War asserts the subordination of means to ends, and war as an 
extension of national policy. It also asserts that victory in warfare comes as the result of the maximum possible 
application of force, in space and time; in other words, through total war. 
37 This is not to contend that the international system (of law, commerce, inter-State relations and so on) did not 
exist on the same geographical scale prior to 1945.11 docs suggest, however, that the plurality, density, diversity 
and instability of the system became fundamentally different and exponentially greater in degree. 
38 Op. cit. at Note 33, pp. 395-421. Sec also, Op. cit. at Note 35, pp. 124-137. 
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The aspirations of the many newly-created sovereign States, and of their constituent 
tribal, ethnic, cultural, economic and religious groupings, many of which spanned artificially 
mandated international borders, is one further key to understanding the dynamics of 
international relations and law ufter 1945.39 
These aspects of inter-State relationships form the basis for relating evidence of 
historical political events to the range of theoretical perspectives and ideologically-dependent 
frameworks which have been proposed as ways of constructing and comprehending the 
realities of international relations. 
In this way, theoretical accounts of the practise of inter-State relations (which itself 
generates and develops international law) will condition analysis of actual events within 
those relations. In the context of this thesis, the issue becomes tile ways in which analyses of 
the origin, conduct and cessation of the Cold War (and the role of nuclear weapons) are 
coloured by international theory. Such an awareness is necessary to support a broad 
understanding of the legal and political background of the Court's Advisory Opinion. 
6. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY. 
Contemporary international relations theory represents a contested, idiosyncratic, and 
didactic domain of political thought in which practitioners assert a wide range of more, or 
less, mutually exclusive world views, causal relationships and catcgorics. 40 Perhaps the only 
proposition each would agree on is the fundamental importance of applying some definition 
of power in modulating their understanding of relations between States."11 
J9 One regional example of this process is provided by McCloud's study of the colonisation of Southeast Asia, 
bringing as it did the break-up of traditional politics, their social organisations and economic frameworks. The 
new post-colonial States of the region had to build national unity and independence despite, rather than because 
of, their international boundaries. McCloud, D.O. ( 1986). System and pmcess in Southea.rt Asia: the ei'Olllfion 
of a region. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 
40 The vast literature in international relations theory renects the wide diversity of approaches to the study of 
this discipline. An introduction to the main strands of thinking in modern structuralist (as opposed to post-
modern) contemporary theory would include, but not be limited to, Wight (1966), Bull (1972 and 1976), 
Keohane (Ed. 1986, and 1988), Lijphart (1974b), Skocpol (1979), Walz (i979) and Wallerstein ( 1991 ). 
41 One widely accepted definition of power is the ability to influence an agent in such a way as to cause that 
agent to do something he, she or it would not otherwise have done. Paolini's study of the work of Foucault on 
alternative post-modem conceptions of power relations is one example of the persuasive usc of a post-
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To illustrate this point, one need look no further than the development of 
international theory since the publication of Martin Wight's influential 1966 paper,42 in 
which he claimed the non-existence of international theory, given the domination of the State 
in general political theory (which as a result was inappropriate to a sphere in which survival 
was the paramount concern). 
Such an extreme position does not advance tdiS discussion, which takes as 
fundamental the necessity for international relations analysis to accept the agency of 
individuals, groups of individuals, and institutions in international, as well as domestic 
political affairs. 
Nevertheless, analysis of the role of individual agency in theories of international 
relations, as opposed to that of institutions and ideologies, is problematic in several widely 
accepted theories which have been advanced during the last thirty years to explain and 
structure inter-State and global relationships.43 
6.1. ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSES IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY. 
The first a priori debate of recent note has been that between communitarian and 
cosmopolitan paradigms in the development of theory. As Smith notes,'~4 a communitarian 
perspective emphasises the assignment of rights and duties in international society to 
political communities, as such. By contrast, cosmopolitan theories stress the need for moral 
arguments in this sphere to be based on individuals, or on humanity as a collective whole.45 
structuralist epistemology to explicate a perplexing dynamic in international relations theory. The agenda of the 
realists is now being undermined by new discourses such as this. Paolini, A.J. (1993). Foucault, realism and the 
£ower discourses in international relations. Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (I), 98- I 17. 
2 Wight's paper was entitled "Why is there no international theory'?" ( 1966). In H. Butterfield and M. Wight 
(Eds.), Diplomatic lm•estigations: essays in the theory ofinlemarional politics (pp. 17-34). London: Allen & 
Unwin. It has been interpreted as a reminder of the fragility of international relations, and the ephemeral nature 
of a regime of sustained co-operation between States. Cited in Hur~cll, A. (1995). International political theory 
and the global environment. In K. Booth & S, Smith (Eds.), International relations theory today (pp. 129·153). 
Cambridge: Polity Press. At p.l51. 
43 Smith, S. (1995). The self. images of a discipline: a genealogy of international relations theory. In K. Booth & 
S. Smith (Eds.), International relations theory today (pp. 1-37). Cambridge: Polity Press. This article develops 
a compact narrative which traces the evolution of vectors of international theory from the 1950s to the present. 
At Chapter I. 
44 Ibid, p.9. 
45 Ibid. There is no doubt that a perception of international relations which is built on recognition of the self-
worth of the individual, and on individual moral transcendence, is one far removed from that of (neo)realists 
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This dichotomy tends to pose more questions than it answers. Not the least of its 
difficulties is the question of the practical relevance of moral argument to theories 
incorporating a realist slant or component. It is possible, however, to argue that much 
contemporary conventional intJrnationallaw, such as the 1966 International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 46 and the 1984 UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment41 do 
indeed assign moral rights to individuals within the international sphere, and that this trend is 
likely to increase as Kantian humanists gain ground.48 
An early schematic useful for comprehending international relations theory was that 
expounded by Wight in the 1950s, which identified three traditions: realism, rationalism and 
revolutionism, or alternatively that of Machiavellians, Grotians and Kantians49• This 
convenient trichotomy comprehends, respectively, international anarchy, mixed conflict and 
co-operation, and transcendent humanity. Its most fundamental difficulty may be that such 
categories are not obviously mutually compatible, and that they depend on discrete 
epistemologies. From a practical perspective, it may not be defensible to privilege one 
tradition while excluding its rivals completely.50 
A third categorisation has been that o~ ·t.-;: division of Twentieth century international 
relations theory between the three "Waves" (The Wilsonian idealism of the imerhellwn, the 
"realism" of the post-war world, and the social-scientific "behaviouralist" approach of the 
1960s), together with the two "Great Debates" which separated them. 51 
and practitioners of international diplomacy, 11Je caveat here should be that this debate is no more than a meta-
narrative, with little rcievancc to purely pragmatic discourses. 
46 60 U.N.T.S. 195. 
47 Misc. 12 {1985), Cmnd. 9593: 23 l.L.M. 1027 and 24/.L.M. 535. 
48 Ibid. 
49 In one sense, such a discrimination in rival theoretical perspectives amounts merely to a discussion about 
ethics and the place of morality in international affairs, and especially warfare. It thus becomes a simplistic 
debate between "moralist" and "realists", Ho!sti, K. J. { 1972) lmernational politics: a framework for analysis. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, at Ch. 14. 
50/bid, Note 45. If each tradition has its own exclusive evaluative criteria, then a comparative discourse will not 
be coherent, and they must exist together, but without being mutually exclusive. 
51 This approach seems to exhibit the tendency, apparent in others, to build theories to fit perceived reality, 
rather than to test evidence against hypotheses. 
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Lijph<lfii2 has argued for the falsity of such a division on the grounds that a more 
defensible discrimination is that between the traditional paradigms of idealism and realism, 
on one hand, and the scientific paradigm of the behaviouralists, on the other. Here the issue 
has become the dispute concerning the utility of a natural science approach to theories of 
international relations, all of which must necessarily incorporate more qualitative rather than 
quantitative analyses of data and other evider.ce.53 
A further debate in international theory, and one its detractors would argue mimics 
the difficulties of Wight's structure noted above, is the more recent "Inter-Paradigm" debate 
of the mid-1980s onward. 54 Now, theorists such as Wallerstein55 argue that there are still 
three substantial accounts of international politics, but that they are located within the same 
framework, and as such are reasonably coherent as between each other. 
The basic categories of disputants have become (and allegedly largely remain): neo-
realism (also tenned "structural realism"), liberalismlglobalism/pluralism, and neo-
Marxism/structura/ism. As Smith indicates,56 this schema is helpful in any attempt to 
understand international relations since each paradigm can be summarised in terms of its 
answers to questions about the main or predominant actors, issues, processes and outcomes 
in the international political arena. In reality, it must be acknowledged that the 
Marxist/structuralist component is becoming rapidly less relevant to analysts following the 
end of the Cold War, and that the substantive debate is now that between the realists and the 
liberals. In this way, current debates seem to turn, perhaps not surprisingly, on alternative 
accounts of human nature. 
Nevertheless, the now-familiar trichotomy tends to suggest over-simplification of 
categories, and the suspicion, alluded to above, of "warehousing" or privileging of one 
~2 Ibid, Note 45. Lijphart, A. (1974a). International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates. 
International Socia/ Science Journal, 26 (1), 11-21; Lijphart, A. (1974b). The structure of the lheoretieal 
revolution in international relations theory. lntemational StudieJ Quarterly, 18 (I), 41-74. 
53 The behavioural, "natural science" phase of social science, prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s, parallels 
the realist political ethos of the Cold War era to the extent of its assumption of the efficacy of determinist 
solutions to problems. The logics of "Massive Retaliation" in US nuclear warfare strategy of that era, and 
measurable behaviour vectors in contemporaneous psychology arc both underpinned by detenninism. 
54 Ibid, Note 45. 
55 Sec Wallerstein, I. (1991). Geopolitic!>' and geuculture: E.rsays on the changing world system. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, especially Chapters 7-9 in regard to the Brandt Report on North/South 
relations, and the middle-run prospects for capitalism in the world economy. 
~6 Ibid, Note 45, at p.l8. 
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category to the detriment of overall coherence. 57 In addition, the inherent inflexibility of 
labels is a methodological criticism, especially for those theorists who work within a post-
modernist or post-positivist epistemology.511 
The realist/liberal dichotomy can, in fact, never be mutually impermeable, since each 
paradigm contains elements of its rival. A more efficient perspective would be a relativist 
one in which a comparison of tendencies and trends does the explanatory work. In this way, 
the relative weight accorded by each world view to such concerns as the use of force in inter-
State relations, basic international co-operation, absolute as opposed to relative gains, and 
the role of positive law becomes measures for assessing the strength of either a (neo) realist 
slant or perspective, as opposed to a liberal one, in explanations of intemational relations. 
As noted above, theoretical accounts of the ways in which States relate to each other 
will condition analyses of actual events within those relations. To that extent, the account of 
theory which predominates in this thesis is the neo-liberalist story,59 summarised as complex 
interaction between States, universal acceptance of norms of international behaviour, and the 
prominent place of non-State actors in the international sphere. While this explanation of 
reality is, like many, vulnerable to accusations of being reflexively constitutive of that 
reality, rather than explaining it60 (a methodological conundrum) it nevertheless seems more 
capable than others of approaching and explaining such contemporary phenomena as 
pluralism, inter-connectivity, flexibility in rapid change, and h11manism in the inter-state 
field. 
It also appears to have the explanatory strength to explicate the origins, conduct and 
ultimate cessation of the Cold War, and its relevance to the present Opinion, especially 
57 Note 52, s11pra. 
SR Note 43, supra. It is not proposed to canvass in detail the work of this school of theory in the field of 
international relations, but merely to acknowledge the influence of writers such as Foucault, Derrida and 
Habermas, especially in relation to their work on the nature of power and knowledge. These writers offer 
alternative epister.10logies concerning, inter alia, discontinuities rather than historical progress, relative rather 
than absolute outcomes, the contingent nature of facts and truth, and the social construction of reality. Loc. cit., 
Note 45, supra, at Ch. 10: Vasquez, J. A. The post-positivist debate: Reconstructing scientific enquiry and 
international relations theory after Enlightenment's fall. Loc.cit., at Note 43, pp. 217-240. 
59 Sec infra, Chapter II, at Note 12. 
60 Tite question is whether the social world has an existence external to its observers, or whether it just is what 
observers make it. This methodological and philosophical complexity is addressed by practitioners of the 
critical school of social theory who assert that knowledge is not value-free. 
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wl1en, as discussed above, the neo~realist perspective IS enlisted to add a measure of 
theoretical balance. 
7. CONCLUSION. 
As an institution whose primary task is the settlement of inter-State disputes, the 
International Court of Justice must operate in the political, as well as the legal domain. As 
such, its judgments must be considered in light of contemporary international political theory 
and reality, and in particular of the imputable world views of its Bench. 
Representing as it does the range of the world's societies, decisions of the Court will 
reflect, and be seen as reflective (in whatever degree) of the political, as well as juridical 
positions and influences of their ussentient and dissentient Judges. Explanations of the ways 
in which States relate to each other will play a role in determining at~d explaifliflg its 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER II. 
OVERVIEW OF THE OPINION. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
On 8 July 1996 the International Court of Justice delivered its Advisory Opinion, 
General List No. 95, "Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", in response to 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/75 K, adopted on 15 December 1994. 1 
The operative paragraph of that Resolution incorporated the following question: "Is 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international 
law ?2 Some measure of the importance with which the international community of nations 
viewed this matter can be gained by the fact that no Jess than twenty-two States appeared 
before the Court to present oral submissions/ while forty-three States submitted written 
material.4 
This Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice is of great significance 
for the international community for fundamental and complex reasons. It is the first occasion 
on which the pre-eminent judicial body concerned with the international legal regime has 
addressed the cardinal question of the legal status of nuclear weapons in intemationallaw.5 
Engaging as il does one of the most controversial political issues touching modern 
international law, the Opinion can be seen as a test of the Court's judicial independence 
1The full text of the Advisory Opinion is available [on-linc]at: http://web.inter.NL.net/hcc/A.Malten!Unan5-
A.html. lt incorporates UN General Assembly Resolution 49n5K, together with a detailed description of the 
conduct of the case, and of States appearing before the Court. [35 l.L.M. 809 (1996)]. The only previous case 
before a superior court which concerned the question of the legality of nuclear weapons was the !963 Shimoda 
Case, brought before the District Court of Tokyo by five Japanese citizens against the Japanese Government. 
The Court held that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not justifieri by military necessity, and that 
the United States had thereby violated international law. 8 Japanese Ann. lnt'l. L. 212 (1964); 58 A.J.I.L. !016 
(1964). 
2 Ibid, pam I. 
3 Ibid, Note 1., para. 9. 
4 International Court of Justice (1996). Legalify of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents. The Hague: Author. 
'The Court has now delivered a total of 23 Advisory Opinions since its constitution in 1946. Lnc. cit., at Ch.l, 
Note 2, p. 369. 
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within the United Nations system, and the degree to which it may be susceptible to political 
pressures from States in a rapidly evolving international environment.6 
In this context, a distinction may be drawn between those States which seek to 
emphasise the value of the Court's deliberations to the international system, and the 
development of international law, and those which would diminish its standing and influence 
over issues which they regard as falling outiiide its purview (indeed, several States argued 
before the Court that it was not competent to give an Advisory Opinion in the present case, 
having regard to its duties under its Statute).7 
From this perspective, the Opinion can be seen as representative of a fundamental 
antinomy lying at the heart of international relations. Should relations between States be 
mediated through the acknowledgment of the rule of international law (as exemplified in the 
principle of pacta sum servar1da, and the text of the Charter of the United Nations) in order 
to impose coherence and comity? Conversely, should they be governed, at the most basic 
level, by those long-established customary principles and rules, founded on State 
sovereignty, neutrality and consent, which "shape and reinforce international anarchy"?8 
Put another way, is the nation-State still adequate to maintain order and avoid wars in 
6 The issue of the character, location and intensity of political influence, whether fonnal or infonnal, on 
individuals, organisations and States, as well as the International Court of Justice itself, forms an important 
theme in this thesis. One component of that debate will involve the Statute of the Court, and the provenance of 
its Judges. An introduction to this debate is provided by Gill, T. D. (1989). Litigation strategy at the 
lntemational Court. Dordrccht: Martinus Nijhoff, especially Part One, Section I: "The Changing Political 
Environment and its Impact on the Court.", at pp. 5- 36. 
7 The Oral Submissions of States such as France and the Russian Federation, which challenged the competence 
of the Court to deliver an Opinion, arc available (to the extent of their relevance here) at [on-line} : 
http.://www..icjquote.html. That source also includes edited transcripts of Submissions representing a range of 
positions taken by States oo the law, and evidence of fact, available to the Court. 
8 Kegley, C. W. & Wittkopf, E. R. (1993)- World politics: trend and transformation (3rd rev. cd). Houndmills: 
Macmillan, at p.501. These authors provide a discussion of the structural limits of the international legal 
system, at p.501 et seq., which canvlsscs both iL<; institutional constraints (such as the lack of supra-national 
rule enforcement) and its relevance based on the overwhelming preponderance of those States acknowledging 
basic principles of international Jaw (such as treaties, conventions and formal declarations) which they 
recognise and respect. See also Starke, J. G. (1986). The science of peace (rev. cd.). Sydney: Legal Books Pty. 
Ltd, at Ch. 8: "The Legal Framework of Peace", and specifically pp. 130-133: "Weaknesses of imernational 
law", in which he states (p.130), inter alia, that "The crucial weakness remains ... that international law suffers 
from the absence of external force or sanctions to ensure the observance of its rules under all circumstances." 
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a world in which military imbalances are underpinned by the reality that every State is 
"unconditionally vulnerable to virtually total destruction"?9 
These questions are driven by the debate in the philosophy of international law 
between those who regard municipal and international law as separate legal orders which 
dispute for primacy, and those who see them as part of the same order, one or other being 
supreme within that order. 10 
This so~called monist/dualist debate forms the foundation upon which the arguments 
led by States in the present Opinion were based, in respect both of the competence of the 
Court to deliver an Opinion, and its substance, based on fact and law. 
This thesis, as a critique of the present Opinion, will address, inter alia, the issues 
noted above. In doing so it will necessarily be concerned with the legal character of the 
Court's argument and conclusions. However, it must be emphasised that the Opinion has 
been rendered in the context of both the global arena of geo-politics and international 
relations, and a range of influences, both tacit and overt, upon the Court itself. No 
worthwhile examination of the provenance, nature and possible effects of the Opinion can 
ignore this duality. 
Finally, the fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of international politics, 
and of the international system, will be informed here by the structural theory, canvassed in 
Chapter I, of "nee-liberal institutionalism" or "nco-liberalism". 1 1 The b1sic tenets of such an 
underManding of international affairs can be summarised as: 
9 Brown, S. (1991). The world polity and the nation-state system. In R. Little & M. Smith (Eds), Perspectives 
011 world politics (rev.cd., pp. 263-271, at p.264). London: Routledge. Reprinted from International Journal, 
vol. xxxix, no. 3 (Canadian Institute oflntcrnutional Affairs, (1984) ut pp. 509-528), 
10 Harris, D. J. (1991). Cases and materials 011 illfernational/aw (3rd rev. cd.). London: Sweet & Maxwell, at 
pp. 69-72. Fain, H (1987) Normative politics and the commw1ity of nations. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Pre~s. elaborates the dichotomy between the Monist concept, epitomised by Hans Kelsen's grund norm that 
"£he States ought to behave as they have ulways behaved", and the Dualist (or pluralist) view that the 
jurisprudential relationship between the international legal system and the separate domestic legal systems is 
problematic, Most Dualists contend that governments may legally prefer domestic law when it conflicts with 
international law (pp. 39-41 ). 
11 Lnc. cit., supra, Note 9, at Chapter 2. These authors discuss a range of "rival perspectives in changing 
contexts'' in terms of alternative images, or "mental models" of objective realities. Conceding that the quest for 
theory is "elusive", they offer the political Idealism of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, in contrast with the 
Realist project of those who view the State-based, Hobbesian "balance-of power" the~is as objective reality. A 
third, now Jnrgely discredited approach (as they point out) is the empirical, pseudo-scientific behavioural 
approach of the 1960s and early 1970s. See purticularly pp. 20-28. 
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(a.) Co-operation and complex interdependence between States in all spheres of 
activity; 
(b.) Universal adherence to principles and norms of international behaviour by 
States; 
(c.) The essential role of non-State actors in the international arena. 12 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE OPINION. 
A review of the dispositif of the Opinion will be followed by a summary of the 
substantive arguments developed in its text. 13 
2.1. THE COURT'S DISPOSITIF. 
From its deliberations as to the facts and law applicable to the question before it, the 
Court delivered its dispositifin the following terms: 
A. 
B. 
Unanimously, 
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific 
authorisation of the threat or use of nuclear weapons~ 
By eleven votes to three, 
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any 
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons as such; 
12 Ibid. Such "non-State actors" include, for example, the Court itself, other specialist U.N. Organisations, and 
many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). For a discussion of the implications of "Globalism" for the 
international system, sec: Holsti, 0. R. (1989) Models of international relations and foreign policy. Diplomatic 
History, 13, 15-43. 
13 Ibid, Note I. 
c. 
D. 
E. 
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Unanimously, 
A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 
2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the 
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful; 
Unanimously, 
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the 
requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly 
those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as 
with specific obligations under treaties and undertakings which expressly deal 
with nuclear weapons; 
By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote, 
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international Jaw 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements 
of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme 
circumstances of self~defence, in which the very survival of the state would be 
at stake. 14 
14 Ibid, Note 1., at para. 105. President Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria used his casting vote to allow the 
adoption of the terms of para. 105 (2 E). Eyflinger, A. (1996). The International Court of Justice 1946- 1996. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, provides a treatment of the history and constitution of th~ Bench of the 
F. 
23 
Unanimously, 
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disannament in all its aspects under strict and 
effective international control. 
The Court had concluded, unanimously, that no State may point to customary 
international law, nor to treaty law, as in any way authorising the use, or threat of use, of 
nuclear weapons (Paragraph 105 2A). However, it found (by eleven votes to three) that no 
such laws specifically prohibited the threat or use of nuclear weapons in a general and 
comprehensive way (Paragraph 105 2B). 
Secondly, it reaffirmed, unanimously, the principles of non-use of force, and self-
defence in relations between States, as incorporated in Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, and their applicability to nu..;lear weapons (Paragraph 105 (2)C). 
Thirdly, it identified, unanimously, the international law which o.pplies to the threat 
or use of nuclear WNlpons, nominating the international humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflict, and the lex specialis oL tteaty obligations and other express undertakings in 
respect of nuclear weapon.<; g~ ir.~ernatioual law most particularly applicable to the question 
(Paragraph 105 2D). 
Fourthly, it found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally 15 be 
contrary to principles and rules of humanitarian law in anned conflict (emphasis added), but 
that it was unable to conclude whether this was so in an extreme circumstance of self-
Court, including, inter alia, the distribution of scats, the nomination and cledion of Judges, and the Presidency 
of the Court. Sec Appendix 2: Statute of the Court. 
15 Many Dissenting Opinions of Judges emphasise the fact that the usc of the word "generally" is unsatisfactory, 
since it is imprecise, ambiguous, and wholly unsuitable for use in connection with the application of 
international law, and particularly the rules of humanitarian law, to the threat or usc of nuclear weapons. An 
exemplar of this position is the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, [foe. cit. Note lJ in which he notes 
in his "Preliminary Observations on the Opinion of the Court", para. (c)(ii), that the word "generally" grades in 
meaning from "as a general rule, commonly", to "universally, with respect to all, or ncnrly all", with interim 
alternatives, Available [on-line] at: http:www.dfat.gov.au!ild/icj/_nuc/w_man_a.html. Collins Reference 
Thesaurus (1992) includes the word "universally" as an acceptable alternative. London: William Cullins. 
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defence "in which the very survival of the State would be at stake" (Paragraph 105 (2)E). 16 
(It is notable that these findings turned on the casting vote of the President of the Court, 
since voting on this section of the dispositifwas split equally)P 
Finally (at Paragraph 105 (2) F) the Court identified the international community's 
obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations which would lead to meaningful end 
pennanent nuclear disarmament "in all its aspects". 
2.2 THE TEXT OF THE OPINION. 
2.2.1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 
The Court found that it was competent under the li.:!nns of Article 96 of the Charter of 
the United Nations 18 to give an Advisory Opinion on a legal question to the General 
Assembly, and that there were no "compelling reasons" for it to refuse to give such an 
Opinion. 19 
Before seeking to define the extent of relevant international law nonns available to it, 
the Court had first to address the argument that the word "permitted" in the "Request for 
Opinion" implies a negative understanding of the basis of international law. Thus, and 
contrary to the principles of sovereignty and consent, the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
were said to be subject only to prohibition in either conventional or customary law. 20 It was 
argued by some States that the dicta in the "Lotus"21 Case of the Pennanent Court, and those 
16 The second limb of Para. 105 (2)E consists of a reply to a question which was not put to the Court by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, namely the "extreme circumstances of self-defence" in which the 
survival of a State would be at risk, This in itself serves to bring the entire Opinion, prima fade, into question. 
17 Op. cit., supra, Note 6. 
18 Ibid, Note 10, at p.987. 
19/bid, Note I, paras. 10-19. The Court aflinned that the question posed was of a ''legal" nature, 
notwithstanding its political clements, and that it should exercise its discretionary power under Article 65 of i!S 
Statute (Op. cit., supra, Not~ 10, at p.IOOI) to give an opinion. The question did not lack relevance or 
precision, and an Advisory Opinion would not move the Court beyond its judicial role, and into the realm of 
law-making. See Appendix 2, the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
20 The representative of France, in Oral Submissions before the Court, was forceful in articulating this 
argument. International Court of Justice, Oral submissions, written s!atements and re.'iponses. Unpublished 
material. 
21 P.C.I.J Reports, Series A, No. !0. The Wrus Case (France v. Turkey (1927)) turned on France's contention 
that Turkey had acted in conflict with principles of international law by prosecuting a French national for 
im '•mtary manslaughter of eight passengers and crew of the Turkish vessel Boz-Kourt in international waters 
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in the "Nicaragua"22 Case of the present Court supported their contention that States are able 
legally to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless specifically and expressly prohibited from 
doing so by treaty or custom. 
The Court's apparently peremptory dismissal of these arguments rested on the fact 
that the nuclear-weapon States acknowledged the restrictions imposed on their actions by the 
general principles and rules of humanitarian law. Hence, there was no question of a pre-
determined burden of proof imposed on those States seeking to promote the cause of 
illegality of nuclear weapons.23 
2.2.2. RELEVANT LAW. 
The Court then considered relevant applicable law, noting Article 6 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,24 and Article II of the 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime o[Genocide.25 
The Court examined a range of nonns relating to the safeguarding and protection of 
the natural environment, together with provisions of various treaties and other instruments 
which have lhat airn?6 While their applicability in times of war was acknowledged to be 
following its coHision with the French steamer Lorm·. The Judgment of the Court rejected France's contention 
that Turkey should be able to point to "some title to jurisdiction recognized by international law in favour of 
[it]". It stated that international law governs relations between "independent Stales", and that restrictions upon 
that independence "cannot be presumed" (para 3). 
22 I.C.J. Reporrs 1986, p.4. The Nicaragua Case (Merits) (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicmagua v. United States of America) ) concerned military and other measures taken by the 
United States against the Sandanista Government of Nicaragua, including direct attack on Nicaraguan strategic 
assets, and assistance to the Contra rebels seeking its overthrow. Nicaragua alleged that the United States had 
infringed customary and conventional international law, and Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, in 
terms of its use of force. In its Judgment, the Court stated (para, 269) "in international law there arc no rules, 
other than such rules as may be accepted lly the State concernrd. by {{taty or otherwise, whereby the level of 
armaments of a sovereign State can be limited". 
23 Ibid, Note 1., paras. 20-22. The Court's conclusion here is based on induction from the particularity of 
humanitarian law to the general corpus of international law. 
24 Ibid, Note 10, at p. 612. [999, U.N.T.S. 171; 61 A.J.I.L. 870 (1967)]. Para. I. of Article 6 states: "Every 
human being has the right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
(his) life." Bailey states that, if the I.C.C.P.R. is declaratory of existing law, rather than creative of new 
international law, then all States will be bound by the principle, whether or not they have ratified the Covenant. 
Bailey, P. (1990). Human rights: Australia in an intemationa/ colllext. Sydney: Butterworth's, pp. 248, at 249. 
25 78 U.N.T.S. 277; 45 A.J.l.L., Supp., 6 (1951). Article II lists acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national , ethnic, racial or religious group, as such". 
26 Ibid, Note I,, paras 27-34. They included, among other instruments, treaties such as the 1977 Additional 
Protocol/ to the Geneva Convemions of 12 August 1949 (1125 U.N.T.S. 609), which proscribes weapons 
having widespread and severe environ ,nental effects, and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration of 1992. 
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contentious, the Court recognised the real environmental threat, in both space and time, of 
the existence of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it stated its view, at Paragraph 30, that the 
obligations of States to protect the natural environment during military conflict were not 
absolute, although regard for environmental considerations mm;t form part of the assessment 
of the necessity and proportionality of actions in self-defence.27 
The substantive finding in respect of environmental international law was that it does 
not specifically p;ohibit the use of nuclear weapons. 
At this stage, the Court was able to conclude that the laws most relevant to the 
question posed were those relating to the use of force within the tenns of !he Charter of the 
United Nations, the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct of 
hostilities, and any specific treaties on nuclear weapons that the Court might determine to be 
relevant.28 
2.2.3. APPLICATIONOFLAW. 
The remaining part of the text of the Opinion is devoted to the application of the 
identified relevant law, and to the conclusions which the Court drew from its own 
jurisprudence and the submissions of States in framjng its dispositif. In a systematic review, 
it began by emphasising the primacy of U.N. Charter provisions concerning the use of force 
and self-defence, their applicability to nuclear weapons, and the fundamental difficulties in 
the legal use of nuclear weapons, given the unique characteristics of these devices. It found 
that the threat of use explicit in the notion of deterrence must conform with Charter 
provisions, and that any legal use of force in self-defence, while proportionate to the force 
used by an aggressor, must also conform with humanitarian law.29 
27 Ibid, Note 10, at pp. 848, 849. The customary principles of necessity and proportionality in self-defence arc 
taken from the dicta in the Caroline case: [29 H.F.S.P. 1137-1138; 30 B.F.S.P. 195-196[. 
28 Ibiti, Note 1., para. 34. 
29/bid, Note 1., paras. 37-50. The Court's acknowlerlgment of the political reality of "deterrence" in 
international relations is apparent in para. 45, in which it takes note of the tenns of Security Council Resolution 
984 (1995). That Resolution concerns security assurances made by each of the declared nuclear weapon States 
(United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) in the context of the extension of the Treaty on the 
Non-proltferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 [!973 Aust. T.S. No.3]. 
Most Dissenting Op:nions state without equivocation that the latter proposition is fundamentally and absolutely 
impossible of perfonnancc. 
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It moved on to consider the law applicable to armed conflict, in tenns both of specific 
rules, and of general principles and rules of humanitarian law. Finding that illegality, 
according lo State practice, must be based on prohibition, and not on the absence of 
authorisation, the Court examined the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement vf 
Disputes of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in respect of "poison or poisoned 
weapons",30 and conventional prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction.31 It found 
110 express prohibition in any case. It reviewed treaty law relevant to nuclear weapons (their 
acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and testing),32 and here approached the 
essence of contention surrounding the issue of the legality of nuclear weapons. The 
fundamental tension between the competing claims of humanitarian law and the doctrine of 
deterrence is nowhere more evident than here?3 
That tension was reflected, in the Court's view, in the competing claims made by 
States in respect of the effect of the various nuclear weapon treaties on international law. It 
referred to those States which contended that such treaties "bear witness, in their own way, 
to the emergence of a rule of complete prohibition of all uses of nuclear weapons."34 By 
contrast, it noted the argument of States which hold the view that treaties which 
acknowledge the existence of the principle of deterrence (such as the 1968 Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its indefinite extension in 1995), together with 
their acceptance as a fait accompli by non-nuclear weapon States, "confirm[sJ and 
rcinforce[sJ the evident logic upon which those instruments are based." Any imputed 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would "be contrary to the very text of those 
instruments."35 
·
10 Ibid, Note I., at para 54. They comprised the S:;cond Hague Declaration uf 29 July 1899 [U.K. T.S. 9 (1901), 
Cd. 798], the Regulations annexed to the Hague Con\'ention /Vof 18 October 1907 [36 Stat.2277; TS 539; I 
Bevans 631], and the Geneva Gas Prorocol of 17 June 1925 [TIAS No. 8061,94 LNTS65]. 
31 The latter comprised the 1972 Convellfion 011 the Prohibition of the De1•elopmelll, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction [26 USTS 583; 
T.l.ll.S. 8062; 1015 U.N.T.S. 163] and the !993 Convemion on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapon.\· and 011 their Destruction [Mise 21 (1993), Cm. 2331; 
32 I.LM. 800]. 
·
12 Ibid, Note 1., pams 58, 59 . 
.13 Ibid, Note I., paras. 51- 63. 
34 Ibid, Note 1., para. 60. 
·1 ~ Ibid, Note 1., pam61. Sec also supra, Note 8. The Oral Submission of Malaysia, forthrightly characterising 
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as "at best an Atlantic concept of the Cold War", went on to assert that the 
invocation of the right to self-defence perverts that right in the context of deterrence, which denies "the 
28 
The Court concluded that treaties dealing with nuclear weapons, as a corpus of 
conventional law, did not constitute a prohibition by themselves, but that they could be seen 
as foreshadowing a future general prohibition.36 
It then turned to customary international law to detennine whether a prohibition of 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons flowed from that sourc.;! of Iaw.37 The practices of States 
were examined insofar as they could demonstrate the existence of a customary rule of 
prohibition. The Court noted that no nuclear weapon State had used nuclear weapons in war 
since 1945, but that those States had, through their doctrine of deterrence, reserved the right 
to use them. It also noted the manifold General Assembly resolutions, beginning with 
Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, which have consistently affinned the illegality 
of nuclear weapons:"8 However, it concluded that neither practice constituted a customary 
rule specifically proscribing nuclear weapons. In respect of General Assembly resolutions, it 
noted that many had received substantial negative votes, and that the emergence, as lex lata, 
of a customary rule of prohibition by this route was hampered by the tension, referred to 
above, between this nascent opinio juris, and the continuing adherence to the doctrine of 
19 deterrence.· 
Having found no fully-formed opinio juris on the question before it, the Court moved 
on to canvass the vast body of humanitarian law; the codified provisions of Hague and 
Geneva law which encapsulate the extent of customary humanitarian law, and are brought 
together in the two I 977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It found that 
international law, predating as it does the advent of nuclear weapons, applies to them as to 
any other weapon. It reinforced its findings by referring to the celebrated "Martens Clause", 
fundamental principles of humanity." In such a case, international law could not be utilised to support State 
~ractices which deviate from those principles and "mainstream aspirations." Loc. cit., at Note 20. 
61bid, Note 1., paras. 62, 63. Sec also supra, Note 15, in respect of the Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry, at Part VII (I): "The Non-Proliferation Treaty." 
37 Ibid, Note 1., paras 64- 73. 
38 Judge Oda, in Part II of his Dissenting Opinion, provides a detailed chronology of the history of General 
Assembly Resolutions since the 1961 Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear a11d Thermo-
Nuclear Weapons[ A/RES/1653 {XVI)], available [on-line] at http;//www.dfat.gov.autild/icj_nuc/oda_a.html. 
3~1bid, Note 1., para. 73. Elias {1995) The nature of the subjective clement in customary international law,/nt. 
& Camp. L Q., 44, 501-520, discusses the nature of the opinio juris, its function iu the development of 
customary intcrroationallaw, and its differentiation from consent and will in relations between States. 
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which affords general humanitarian protection in the absence of specific agreements, based 
on established custom, the principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.40 
In its survey of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict the Court emphasised 
that the fundamental rules of this domain of law must be observed by all States, since they 
"constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law."41 The extensive 
codification of humanitarian law merely gave expression to pre~existing customary law, such 
as that constituted by the "Martens Clause" discussed above. 
The Court turned finally to consider the principle of neutrality, finding that it applies 
to all international armed conflicts, "whatever type of we;ipDns might be used".42 
2.2.4. LEGALITY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The remainder of the Opinion concerns itself with argument on the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapom: in certain circumstances. In contrast to the view of many 
States that the nature of nuclear weapons (their massive, uncontrollable and indiscriminate 
effects) determines their absolute illegality in terms of humanitarian law and the principles of 
neutrality,43 some held that this was not the case. 
The United Kingdom asserted that, given their use was lawful in terms of self-
defence and the principles of necessity and proportionality, their legality in tenns of 
humanitarian law must be determined on the particular circumstances of each use.44 
40 Ibid, Note 1., paras 74-87. As the CotJrt states, the "Martens Clause" was first included in the I 899 Hague 
Con vel/lion with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (supra, Note 30), and is now incorporated, 
i111er alia, within Article I, para. 2 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions [1125 
U.N.T.S. 609]. 
41 Ibid, Note I., para, 79. Set> also Note 30. The Court reinforced its argument by noting, at para. 80, that the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal had found in 1945 that the Regulations annexed to the Hague 
Conventirm IV of 1907 "were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the 
customs and laws of war." (International Military Tribunal, Trial of tile Major War Criminals, 14 November 
1945 · I October 1946, Nuremberg, 1947, vol. I, p.245; 41 A.J.l.L. 224 (1947) ). 
42 Ibid, Note 1., paras 88, 89, cited at para. 89. The Court quoted, with approval, the position of an (unnamed) 
State that "The principle of neutrality ... was aimed at preventing the incursion of belligerent forces into neutral 
territory, or attacks on the persons or ships of neutrals." 
41 Ibid, Note l., paras. 92 · 93. 
44 Ibid, Note \., para. 91. See also Notes 27 and 35, supra. Counsel for the United Kingdom, in his Oral 
Statement before the Court on IS November 1995, made the assertion that "It is an inescapable feature of the 
rule [against disproportionate civilian casualties} itself that the greater the military advantage that can 
reasonably be expected to result from the use of a weapon in a particular case, the greater the risk of collateral 
civilian casualties which may have to be regarded as within the law." 
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The Court noted that it had no precise evidence of the nature of such a circumstance, 
nor on the risk of escalation of a limited use of nuclear weapons towards an "all-out use of 
h, h ' ld I "45 1g y1e nuc ear weapons. 
It further stated that it did not have "sufficient elements" to allow it to determine with 
certainty the illegality of nuclear weapons in tenns of the principles and rules of law in 
anned conflict in any circumstances (emphasis added).45 
2.2.5. THE PRINCIPLE OF "STATE SURVIVAL". 
At this point, the Court referred "to the fundamental right of every state to survival"47 
and to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It pointed to 
the established "policy of deterrence", and to security declarations made by nuclear weapon-
declared States (in connection with the 1995 Indefinite Extension of the Treaty on the Non~ 
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) not to resort to them.4M 
3. CONCLUSION. 
The Court was thus constrained "in view of the present state of international law 
viewed as a whole ... and of the elements of fact at its disposal"49 to state that it could not 
reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons by a State in 
an extreme circumstance vf self~defence, in which its very survival would be at stake. 5° 
4 ~ Ibid, Note I., para. 94. 
46 Ibid, Note I., para. 95. 
47 Ibid, Note I., para. 96, the first indication by the Court of its promulgation of this novel dictum. 
48 Ibid, Note 38. Judge Oda, at paras. 37~39 of his Dissenting Opinion, argues that the indefinite extension of 
the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in which one hundred and seventy~five member 
States participated, has finnly established "the NPT regime" in the international community. He states that 
favourable note was taken of the decision of the Conference by General Assembly Resolution SOnDQ, on 12 
December 1995, by a recorded vote of !61 in favour with none against, India and Israel abstaining. 
49 Ibid, Note 1., para. 97. 
50 This conclusion constitutes the substantive finding in the Court's di.rpositif, at Paragraph I 05 (2E). Sec supra, 
at Note 14. 
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This conclusion was echoed in the second limb of the substantive Paragraph of the 
Court's dispositif, Paragraph 105 (2) E, in which, as noted above, it also found that the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and particularly the principles and rules of humanitarian law. 
There is no doubt that the Opinion represents a comprehensive survey of international 
law relevant to the question, in the context of the use of force by States. 
It concluded with a call for all States to negotiate, in good faith, a nuclear 
disarmament convention in terms of their obligations under Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on 
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 51 
31 Ibid, Note 1., paras. 98 -104; Also Note 29, supra. Paragraph 105 (2) F of the dispositif echoed this appeal. 
[79 U.N.T.S. 161]. 
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CHAPTER III. 
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT LED BY STATES. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Having examined the text of the Opinion, and the legal and political frameworks 
within which it was given, it is necessary now to approach the substantive component of the 
thesis. 
Broadly speaking, this will take the form of a critique of the Opinion in tenns of its 
interpretation and application of relevant applicable law and fact before it, and of the Court's 
jurisprudence. 
That will require an examination of evidence from a representative sample of the 
Pleadings of States, 1 in the form both of Written Statements and Oral Submissions made 
before the Court at its public hearings.2 This will reveal the positions of States as to: 
(a.) The Court's jurisdiction in the case, together with its discretion not to hear the 
matter, given that jurisdiction. 
(b.) The most defensible interpretation and application of relevant law and facts to 
the question, as well as the degree of divergence of opinion among States. 
This amJysis, together with a selective review, in Chapter IV, of the Dissenting, 
Separate and Individual Opinions, and Declarations of individual Judges on the Court's 
Bench (all Judges having appended their own Opinion or Declaration) will assemble the 
range of views on both sides of the question. 
With these in mind, it will then be possible to examine critically the strength of the 
Court's Opinion, having regard for: 
1 The Statute of the International Court of Justice fonns part of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 66, 
Paragraph 2, authorises the Court to seek information on a question which is the subject of a request for an 
Advisory Opinion, in both written and oral fonns. The response of States to the Court's request will be termed 
"Pleadings". Refer to Appendices I and 2, 
2 Ibid. 
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(a.) Its comprehensiveness. 
(b.) The intemrllogic and coherence of its argument. 
(c.) The continuity and extension of its jurisprudence. 
While the question at issue - "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any 
circumstance pennitted under international law?" - is of universal concern, it is relevant, in 
a narrower sense, to two groups of States: those that possess nuclear weapons, and those that 
do not. 
To this extent, the position of the declared "nuclear weapon States" (The United 
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China) will play a pivotal role in any 
critique of the Opinion. The Pleadings of the United States, the United Kingdom and, to a 
lesser extent, France will be synthesised in determining the position of States which contend 
the legality of a use, or a threat to use, nuclear weapons in war.3 
Of the many States which asserted the opposite conclusion, those which made the 
most useful contributions to the Court's evidence included, but were not limited to, 
Australia, Malaysia, Nauru and the Solomon Islands. The Pleadings of these States, together 
with others, will be used to exemplify the views of the non·nuclear weapon States. 
2. ARGUMENT LED BY STATES FOR THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS. 
The United States, in its Written Statement to the Court, and in its Oral Subrnission,4 
expounded its view that the Court should decline to issue an Opinion, but that, if it chose to 
do so, it should find that no prohibition exists in international law against either the use of 
nuclear weapons, or a threat to use such weapons. The United Kingdom and France, in their 
J The Pleadings of the Russian Federation are less comprehensive (and carefully argued) than those of the other 
three nuclear weapon States r~presentcd before the Court, although their thrust and conclusions arc substantially 
similar. (China, for no reason discernible in the public domain, took no part in the proceedings). Pleadings of 
States· Written Statements received by the Court from I February • 20 June 1995, pursuant to Article 66, 
Paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Intenzational Court of Justice, at The Hague. Loc. cit. Ch. II, at Note 20. 
4 Ibid. 
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Pleadings,5 largely echoed or expanded on the fonns of argument and reasoning deployed by 
the United States. 
2.1 THE COURT'S DISCRETION NOT TO ISSUE AN OPINION. 
The nuclear weapon States acknowledged the right of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.6 
However, they argued that the Court has discretion, pursuant to its Statute,7 not to issue such 
an opinion. 
Both the United States and the United Kingdom expressed their view that the Court 
had characterised the relevant operative Article of its Statute as permissive,8 while the United 
States pointed to the Court's jurisprudence in support of its argument that there were 
"compelling reasons" for the Court to decline to issue an Opinion? The United Kingdom 
raised the further issue of judicial propriety, citing judgments of the Court which may be 
"devoid of object or purpose", 10 may be "remote from reality'', 11 or be incapable of effective 
application. In its view, such judgments must "jeopardise its judicial propriety". 12 
5 Ibid. 
6 Charter of the United Nations, Article 96, para. I. Refer to Appendix I. 
7 Statule of the 1/lfernational Court of Justice, Article 65. Articles 65-68 arc concerned with the Court's 
jurisdiction in the issuing of Advisory Opinions. The Court's Statute forms part of the Charter of the United 
Nations. At Appendix 2. 
R Ibid, Note 7. Article 65, para. I, provides that "The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question 
at the request of whatever body may be authorised by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
to make such a request." (emphasis added). 
9 In the Judgmems oftlze A.dministrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation Upon Complaints 
Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J.Reports 1956, p.86, the Court concluded that "Notwithstanding the pennissive character of Article 
65 ... only compelling reasons could cause the Court to adopt...a negative attitude .... " Cited in the Written 
Statement of the United States of America, 20 June 1995, at pp. 3, 4, The Hague. UJc Cit., Ch. II, Note 20. 
10 Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, at p.37. Written Statement of the United 
Kingdom, 16 June 1995, at p. 10. The Hague. Ibid. 
11 Northern Cameroons Case, I.C.J.Reports 1963, p. 30, at p.33. 
12 1bid., Note 10. At p. 21 the Court stated: "In exercising this discretion, the International Court of Justice, like 
the Pcnnanent Court oflntcrnational Justice, has always been guided by the principle that, as a judicial body, it 
is bound to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character even in giving advisory opinions. If the 
question is a legal one which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may none the less decline to do 
so. As this Court has said in previous Opinions, the pennissive character of Article 65, paragraph I, gives it the 
power to examine whether the circumstances of the case arc ef such a character as should lead it to decline to 
answer the question". 
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The nuclear weapon States expressed their opinion that these dicta were relevant to 
the present request on the grounds that: 
(a.) The question was vague and abstract, and that the Court could never have 
sufficient material to enable it to detennine all the numerous combinations 
of circumstances in which a threat or use of nuclear weapons might arise. 
(b.) It addressed complex issues which are the subject of consideration among 
interested States, and within other bodies of the United Nations which have an 
express mandate to address these matters. 
(c.) An Opinion by the Court would provide no practical assistance to the General 
Assembly in carrying out its functions under its Charter. 
(d.) An Opinion by the Court would have the potential to undermine progress 
alr.:.<'-dy in train on this sensitive subject (most particularly in respect of 
disannament negotiations) and, therefore, is contrary to the interest of the 
United Nations Organisation. 13 
In general tenns, these submissions reflect a "black-letter" perspective of 
international law which, perversely, denies its application to the special case of nuclear 
weapons (seen as qualitatively different from all other types). It is submitted that this is not, 
obviously, the case. 
13 Loc. cit., Note 9, at pp. 1-7; Lo!'. cit., Note 10, at pp. I; 9-20. Also cf the Wrillen Statement of France, 20 
June 1995, pp. 4-20, which canvasses substantially similar grounds (given in French; no translation is available 
from the Court). Loc. cit., Ch. II, at Nole 20. These Pleadings may be considered in conjunction with the 
statement of Mr. Harold Heilsnis, Director for Public Communications, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary 
of Defense, United States of America, that: 
The elimination of nuclear weapons remains a long-term goal for the United States, but 
implementing such a goal in the short-term implies an extremely optimistic scenario of 
world events. 
Heilsnis, F (1994). Director for Public Communications, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense,\ 'ihington, D.C. Unpublished manuscript, in the possession of the author. 
----- ---··-------------·· 
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2.2 THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION POSED. 
In general terms, the United States founded its position (that nuclear weapons are not 
prohibited per se, nor in terms of their use) on four propositions: 
(a.) That there is no general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. 
(b.) That the law of armed conflict does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. 
(c.) That international environmental and human rights instruments do not 
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. 
(d.) That these conclusions ~rply equally to a threat to use such weapons. 14 
The United Kingdom added a further step in the Pleadings of nuclear weapons States 
by its contention that there are circumstances of self-defence, in the last resort, in which the 
use of nuclear weapons must be regarded as legal. This is the first appearance of a principle 
which became central to the Court's Judgment, and must be seen as an intrusion of the 
discriminatory doctrine of deterrence into the customary and Charter law of self-defence. 15 
2.2.1. GENERAL PROHIBITION. 
The nuclear weapons States asserted that "it is a fundamental principle of 
international law that restrictions on States cannot be presumed". 16 Further, a customary law 
14 Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 7-47. 
15 Loc. cit., at Note 10, pp. 36-39, especially at para. 3.37. At para 3.38 the United Kingdom stated, inter alia, 
"Wh01tevcr the theoretical criticisms voiced of the idea of deterrence, the fact is, first, that it has worked and, 
second, that for many years a number of States have based their self-defence upon it." Many non-nuclear States 
would see this as affirmation of a willingness on the part of nuclear weapon States to sacrifice the rule of 
international law for pragmatic self-interest. 
16 Loc. cit., at Note 9, p.8. The United Kingdom cited the dicta in the Nicaragua Case, in which the Court 
stated that : " .... in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State 
concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited, and this 
principle is valid for all States without exception." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Merits), I.C.J.Reports, 1986, p.14, at paragraph 269. Loc. cit, at Note 10, p. 2l.See Chapter II, 
Section 2.2.1. for an expanded examination of this argument. France contended that the question posr!d by the 
General Assembly: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in all circumstance permitted under international 
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prohibition could not be created over the objection of the nuclear weapons States, and was 
not created by abstaining from the use of nuclear weapons in war for humanitarian, political 
or military reasons, ruther than a belief in a legal requirernent. 17 
Moreover, they expressed their understanding that there is no international agreement 
which contains a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. To the contrary, the very 
existence of a range of agreements on aspects of nuclear weapons was evidence of the 
absence of such a general prohibition. 18 
Addressing these instruments categorically, the United States and the United 
Kingdom pointed to: 
(a.) Agreements on the use of other weapons, the pattern of which was said to imply a 
lack of general prohibition in the absence of a similar agreement on nuclear weapons. 19 
law?" (emphasis added) must receive a negative reply, since it is clearly to be understood as being inclusive of 
their illegal use in aggressive war, as well as in self-defence. Loc. cit., at Note 13, p.21. This is a translation of 
the question posed to the Court in French: "Est-il permis en droit international de recourir a fa menace ou a 
l'empfoi d'armes nucfeaires en !ill!!£ circonstances?" The English version refers to "any circumstance", 
allowing France its disingenuous reply that, of course, nuclear weapons may not be used in every conceivable 
circumstance. The Court dealt peremptorily with this legnl tactic at Paragraph 20 of its Opinion by stating that, 
notwithstanding the divergence in the two texts, the object of each was equally clear: to detennine the legality 
of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons. 
17 We. cit., at Note 9, pp. 8-9. The United States sought to extend the meaning of "State practice" as evidence 
of a customary norm by adding a requirement that such practice must not only be "extensive and virtually 
uniform", but also include States whose interests are ''specially affected". It cited the dicta in the North Sea 
Colltinentaf Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The 
Netherlands), l.C.J. Reports, 1969, p.3, at p.43 in support of its position. A contrary view is supported by Judge 
Tanaka in his Dissenting Opinion in the Smtth West Africa Cases, Second Phase, I.C.J. Reports, 1966, p.6, at p. 
291, in which he stated that the objection of one, or a few, States against a practice cannot prevent it from 
establishing a custom, since Article 38, paragraph I (b.) of the Court's Statute (establishing international 
custom as an applicable source of law) docs not exclude the possibility of dissentient States. In Harris, D.J. 
(1991). Cases and materials on international law (3rd rev, ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p.60. 
18 We. cit., at Note 9, pp. 9-15. Alsc, We. cit., at Note 10, pp. 21-35. 
19 Loc. cit., at Note 9, p.IO. TI1c United States argued that these instruments establish a regime of general 
prohibition of certain classes of weapons. The absence of a similar Convention in respect of nuclear weapons 
was held out as evidence that, in this ease, no such general prohibition exists. Those cited included: 
St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868, prohibiting the usc of projectiles under 400 grammcs weight which are 
explosive or charged with fulminating of innammablc substances. [!38 C.T.S. (1863~69); LXIV U.K.P.P. 
(1869)659]. 
Hague Declaration No. 2, 1899, banning the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the distribution of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases. [187 C. T.S. (1898-99) 453; U.K.T.S. 32 (1907). Cd. 3751]. 
Hague Declaration No.3, /899, prohibiting the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the body. [187 
C.T.S. (1898-99) 459; U.K. T.S. 32 ( 1907) Cd. 3751]. 
Hague Regulations on Land Wmfare annexed to Hague Convention No. IV, /907, Article 23 (a.) of which 
prohibits the usc of poison and poisoned weapons. [205 C.T.S. (1907) 227; U.K.T.S. 32 (1910) Cd. 5030]. 
-- -- ------ -- --------
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(b.) Regional nuclear weapons treaties,20 the existence of which were held to have the 
same effect. 
(c.) Agreements on the manufacture, testing or possession of nuclear weapons, the 
most important of which is the 1968 Nuclear Nan-proliferation Treaty, 21 and which again 
arc premised on a lack of general prohibition.22 
Insofar as customary law is concerned in the question of general prohibition, the 
United States sought to emphasis that its own conduct, in bearing the burden of acquiring 
and maintaining nuclear weapons, indicated its belief in their legality, as did "the variety and 
disparity of views expressed by States" on the matterY In its view, these circumstances 
precluded a customary general prohibition against nuclear weapons.24 
Geneva Gas Protocol, Jr• !5, prohibiting the usc of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, or analogous liquids, 
materi<~ls or devices, <1nd bacteriological methods of warfare. [XCIV LN.T.S. (1929) 65~ U.K.T.S. 24 (1930). 
Cmd.3604]. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Productiml and stockpiling of Bacteriological( Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and 011 their Destruction, 1972, prohibiting possession of bacteriological and toxin 
weapons, and reinforcing the prohibition on their usc. [1015 U.N.T.S. 164]. 
Cite mica! Weapons Convention, 1993, prohibiting all usc of chemical weapons, and requiring the destruction of 
existing stocks. [32/.L.M. 800 (1993)]. 
United Nations Convention 011 the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, 1977, prohibiting: the usc of weapons intended to change the environment through the 
deliberate m<~nipulation of natural processes. [ 1108 U.N. T.S. 151]./bid. 
20 Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. !0, II. Regional nucl~ar weapon treaties include the Amarclic Treaty, !959 [402 
U.N.T.S. 71]; the Treaty of Tlatelolco, l 967 [634 U.N. T.S. 281] and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
Treaty, 1985 [24/.L.M. 1440 (1986)]. 
21 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I July !968, [79 U.N.1:S. !61]. 
22 Other treaties of this nature include: 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 1963. [480 
U.N.T.S. 43]; 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Badies, 1967. [ 610 U.N.T.S. 205]; 
Treaty 011 the Prohibition of rhe Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 011 
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 1971. [ 955 U.N. T.S. 115]; 
Treaty on/he Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 1972 [ 944 U.N.T.S, 13]; 
Treaty 011 the Limitation of UndergrowuJ Nuclear Weapon Tt rts, 1974. [ 13 J.L.M. 906 ( 1974 )]; 
Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Slwrr.:r-Range Missiles, 1987. [27 l.L.M. 84 ( 1988)]; 
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Arms, 1993. [ 16 UN Disarmament Yearbook ( 1991 ), App. 
II, p.450]. 
2
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1 Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 14-15. 
24 Ibid. Also, Loc. cit., at Note 10, pp.27-32. Both the United States and the United Kingdom indicated that 
their position was reinforced by their respective Security Declarations made at the conclusion of the 1995 New 
York Conference on the Indefinite Extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. These Declarations, 
given by all five declared nuclear weapon States, are both positive and negative. These States will, according to 
their Declarations: 
(a.) " .... provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon 
State Party to the Treaty ot1the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object 
of a threat of, <~ggrcssion in which nuclear weapons arc used" [U.N. Docs. S/1995/261-265], and 
39 
As far as other sources declaratory of customary law are concerned, the United States 
addressed the many General Assembly Resolutions which condemn nuclear weapons as 
contrary to the U.N. Charter (and to international law generally), and which seek their 
permanent prohibition.25 
It rejected any assertion, however, that such Resolutions create legally binding 
obligations on States, especially since they could not declare custom when "a significant 
number of nuclear weapon States have not accepted them." 
The more reasonable view, as David points out, is that these Resolutions reflect 
ambivalence among non-nuclear weapon States towards two different problems: possession, 
and use (or threatened use) of nuclear weapons. Resigned acceptance of the practice of 
deterrence does not imply acceptance of their use. 
More generally, the whole question of the perception of the role of State consent in 
the customary process, as Lobo de Souza has shown, is internationally contested ground, 
weakening argument relying on some common understanding of its nature.26 
(b.) " .... will not usc nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on [the United States]. 
its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security 
commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon State in association or alliance with a 
nuclear weapon State". [U.N. Doc. A/50/153 (1995)]. 
The United States asserted that these Statements reserve the right to usc nuclear weapons in certain 
circumstances, that they had been noted "with appreciation" by the Security Council in its Resolution 984 
(1995), and that they had not been challenged by any State Party to the treaty. At pp. 15-18. 
25 Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp.l7-20. The first such Resolution, No.\653 (XVI) of !961 has been followed by many 
more, which have appeared annually on the Agenda of Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly since the 33rd 
Session in 1978. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, para. 18. 351.L.M. 809 (1996). 
26 David, E. (1997). The Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the usc of nuclear 
weapons. International Review of the Red Cross, 37 (I), 21-34, at 31. Lobo de Souza, I. (1995) Tile role of 
state consent in the customary process. Int. & Comp. L.Q. 44, 521-539, at 539. l11c United Kingdom, in fact, 
asserted its view thallhc practice of the General Assembly may be taken as reinforcing the absence of evidence 
of an opinio juris on the illegality of nuclear weapons, since it has supported, or even launched, initiatives 
leading to Treaties such as lhe Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Loc. cit., at Note 10, p.35. 
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2.2.2. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT DO NOT PROIDBIT THE 
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 
In view of the Court's dispositif, 27 this assertion fanned the pivotal component of the 
Pleadings of the nuclear weapon States. While they conceded the applicability of the 
intemationallaw of armed conflict,28 they denied that any part of the humanitarian law of 
war prohibited the use of these devices. 29 
More specifically, they argued that it IS insupportable to contend that nuclear 
weapons must, by their nature, transgress the rules of humanitarian Jaw when used in war, 
and that the precise nature of each instance of use must be known to the Court to enable it to 
judge its legality or otherwise. General evaluations in the abstract were held to be 
inappropriate. 
Given the known effects of even the smallest nuclear weapon, it is impossible, it is 
submitted, to characterise the circumstances of any nuclear explosion as abstract in any way. 
27 At Introduction, Chapter II, Section 2.1, J'upra. 
28 Loc. cit., ;~t Note 9, p.2!; Sec also the Written Statement of Russia, at p. 18: "Even if the usc of nuclear 
weapons is in principle justifiable - in individual or collective self-defence - that usc shall be made within the 
framework of limitations imposed hy humanitarian law with respect to means and methods rf conducting 
military activities". 
29 Interestingly, evidence in the present Opinion omitted many technical aspects of the effects of nuclear 
explosions, although much evidence of this kind accompanied the Written Statements of some States in the 
rejected request of the World !i:"-allh Organisation (sec Foreword). It was thus generally more descriptive and 
discursive (since the request was from the General Assembly, rather than .:t specialist U.N. organisation). 
In essence, the humanitarian law of war embraces " ... general principles of prevention of human suffering that 
goes beyond the needs of war". (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wccmmantry, Part III (3): "Outline of 
Humanitarian Law" 35 I.L.M. 309 (1996)). It is also encapsulated in Article 22 of the Regulations on Land 
Warfare annexed to the IVth Hague Convention of !907 [U.K. T.S. 9 (1910), Cd. 5030): 
The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. 
Its other pre-eminent convemional components, constituted in the Twentieth Century, have been the four 1949 
Geneva Convellfions [75 U.N.T.S. 3], and their Protocols I and II of 1977 [1125 U.NT.S. 3, and 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 respectively]. 
It has been stated that the basic function of all humani!adan law is simply to protect, to the grcu\est possible 
extent, the victims of anned conflicts, of whatever nature or cause (McCoubrcy, H. (1990). International 
humanitarian law: the regulation of armed conflicts. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, at p. 5). Such a 
perspective carries with it the universalist's vision of human rights in international law, and would more easily 
incorporate human rights precepts into theju.~ in bello. 
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The United States addressed the various rules of customary and conventional 
humanitarian and other relevant law used by opponents of nuclear weapons to assert their 
illegality. It dealt with them in the following manner: 30 
(a.) Attacks on the civilian population. 
Civilian injury or damage resulting indirectly from a legitimate military attack, as 
such, was not prohibiled.31 
(b.) Indiscriminate weapons. 
Modem nuclear weapons can be aimed at specific military targets to achieve a 
given military objective. They me not inherently indiscriminate. 
(c.) Proportionality. 
The disproportion of a nuclear attack would be wholly dependent on its 
. 1' 
ctrcmnstances:-
td.) Poison weapons. 
Nu,, .1r weapons do not violate the prohibition on poison weapons in humanitarian 
law, which does not apply to them.~~ 
30 Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 22-34. 
Jl The United States pointed here to the fact that the relevant Articles of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Convemions of 1949 (for example, those relating to the protection in war of property and the natural 
environment, and of civilian~ ~ubjected to reprisal (Articles 48, 51 (6), 52 (1), 53 (c), 54 (4), 55 (2), and 56 (4) 
) were never intended to apply to nuclear weapons, as indicated by the lmemational Committee of the Red 
Cross in a statement appended to the text of the Draft Additional Protocol. It added that the United States is not 
n party to the Protocol, not hnving ratified it. Explicit statements (rather than Reservations) to this effect were 
made during negotiation of the Protocol by each nuclear weapon State except China, ar,d no comment or 
objection was made from nny source. The relevant question here is why statements of "understandings" were 
not converted into Reservations to the Protocols, in terms of the 1969 Vienna Com•emion 011 the raw of 
Treaties. [ 1!35 U.N. T.S. 351]. Loc, cit. Note 9, at p.27; Verbatim record of the Oral Submission of the United 
States before the Court, 15 November 1995, by Mr. J. H. McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Defense, pp. 92-93. Lac cit., Ch. II, at Note 20. 
32 For example, the nature of the threat; the importance of destroying the objective; the charJcter, size and 
expected effects of the device, and the magnitude of the expected risk to civilians. Supra, at Note 30, p. 23. The 
customary international Jaw rules on necessity and proportionality have their locus classicus in the Caroline 
Case, 1841-42 [29B.F.S.P. 1137-1138;30B.F.S.P.l95-196]. 
JJ The usc of poison in war is addressed by Article 23 (a) of the Hague Regulutirms appended to the 1907 
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the LAws and Customs of War on lAnd [Inc. cit., at Note 19] which 
prohibits the usc of "poison" or "poisoned weapons". Castren, (cited in Singh, N.- & McWhinney, E. (1989). 
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(e.) The 1925 Geneva Protoco/.34 
Nuclear weapons do not violate the provisions of this important instrument, which 
condemns "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and ... all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices", and which again does not apply to them. 
(f.) Unnecessary suffering.35 
Suffering is only unnecessary when it exceeds that sufficient to achieve a military 
objective. Thus, the effects of nuclear weapons, however severe, may be necessary to 
accomplish a military mission. 
(g.) Environmental effects prohibited by the 1977 Environmental Modification 
Convention.36 
Environmental modification in war must entail a demonstrable intent in order to 
be caught by the provisions of this instrument. 
(h.) Belligerent Reprisals. 
The use of nuclear weapons would not be inconsistent with the customary law of 
reprisal.37 
(i.) Neutrality. 
Nuclear weapons and contemporary imernationallaw (2nd rev. cd.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, at p. 121) 
argues that, since the regulation "especially foriJids" the usc of "poison" or "poisoned weapons", the prohibition 
should be considered to br absolU!e. 
·
14 Supm, Note 19. 
H Supra, Chapter I, at Note 40. Also Loc. cit., at Note 19. The concomitant principle, expressed in the St. 
Petersburg Declaration of 1868, of avoiding actions which would "render death inevitable" is similarly 
discounted in terms of its relevance to nuclear weapons. Loc. cit., at Note 9, p.33. 
36 [1125 U.N.T.S. 3] Articles I, 35 (3) and 55 effectively prohibit "environmental modi!ication techniques" for 
military or other hostile purposes which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects [on the natural 
environment] as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party". 
37 The customary law principle of bemgerent reprisal has its locus classicus in the Nauli/aa Case (Portugal v. 
Germany, 2 R.l.A.A. !012, at p.l026), whose dicta assert that the object of a reprisal must be "to effect 
reparation from the offending State for the offence or a return to legality by the avoidance of further offences". 
Bowell, cited in Judge Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion, has proposed that reprisals arc now illegal in terms 
of the Charter of the United Nations. Loc. cit., at Note 29. Schwa;zenburger (cited in Singh & McWhinney 
(Op. cit., Note 3, p.l 01) ), in respect of the use of prohibited weapons by way of reprisal, comments that: 
.... International law docs not limit reprisals to identical acts. The better opinion ... is probably that 
reprisals must be proportionate to the offence against which they arc directed. 
The inviolability of neutrals is not absolute, and the inevitable violation 
consequent on a use of nuclear weapons is speculative and abstract.38 
U). Genocide. 
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 39 requires "intent to destroy ... a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such."40 Thus, it does not render nuclear weapons illegal per se. 
Apart from universal principles of humanity, application of most of the above turn on 
the principles of distinction between combatants and civilians, of proportionality, and of 
necessity in humanitarian law. Each one, it is submitted, is capable, in light of their known 
effects, of rendering nuclear weapons irretrievably unlawful. 
2.2.3.JNTERNAT!ONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS DO NOT PROHIBIT THE USE OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS. 
In general terms, both the United States41 and the United Kingdom42 disingenuously 
asserted their position that conventional law protecting the environment and human rights 
has little, if any, relevance for the usc of nuclear weapons. 43 
38 Supra, Note 32 
39 [78 U.N.T.S. 277]. 
40 Ibid, Article II. 
41 Loc. cit., at Note 9, pp. 34·46. 
41Loc. cit., at Note 10, pp. 68-71. 
43 Some of the most important conventional instruments in the lield of the environment include: 
Stockholm Declaration 011 the Human Environment, 1972 [UN Doc. AICONF. 48114 & Corr. I ( 1972)]. 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985.[26/.LM. 1529]. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992. [31 I.L.M. 849]. 
Convelllion on Biological Diversity, 1992. [31 I.L.M. 822]. 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992. [UN Doc. NCONF. 151/5/Rcv. J]. 
Their counterparts in the field of human right~ include: 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. [UN Doc. A/8 10]. 
International Covena/11 on Civil and Political Ril;llts, 1966. [UN Doc. A/6316] 
lllfernational Covena/11 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. (UN Doc. A/6316]. 
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These instruments, they contended, were never intended for this purpose, and cannot 
be construed as such. Indeed, their general nature prohibits their construal as specifically 
prohibitory of the use of nuclear weapons.44 
Again, they were intended for operation in times of peace, and not m terms of 
legitimate armed conflict.45 
2.2.4. THE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 
The nuclear weapon States shared the view that the absence of a prohibition against 
nuclear weapons per se must lead to the same conclusion in respect of a threat to use tht-m. 46 
They noted that, while little work has been undertaken on the definition of a threat to 
use force in terms of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Clwrter,47 such a threat involves 
more than mere possession of a weapon. Even deployment of weapons does not, of itself, 
constitute. intent to use, since all States may deploy any weapon in self-defence, individually 
or collectively, as provided in Article 51 of the Charter. 
/ntemarional Convention on the Elimination of all Fanus of Racial Discrimination, 1966. [60 U.N. T.S. I 95}. 
Americmt Convent inn on Human Rig/us, 1969. [ O.A.S. T.S. No. 361. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979. [UN Doc. N34/46J. 
E11ropea11 Conventimlfor the Protection of Human RiRitls and Fundamental Freedoms. 1953 [213 U.N.T.S. 
221). 
Many others address more specific areas, such as slavery. torture, apartheid and education. 
44 The United Kingdom conOatcd the consmml of a particularity from a generality with the caveat that, unless 
expressly provided, "a treaty must be construed against the background of [a State'sJ inherent right of self-
defence". It also enlisted the rule that treaties must be applied and interpreted against the background of general 
principles of international law, in order to reinforce its argument that legitimate self-defence is a sine qua 11011 
for the correct interpretation of all international treaties. Loc. cit., at Note 10, p.63. Cf Article 31 (3) (c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. [ 1155 U.N. T.S. 331]. This argument must be balanced by 
consideration of the intemion of the Parties to any particular treaty, even in mutters bearing upon jus co gens, 62 
B. Y.I.L. I (1991), at60. 
45 Supra, Note 42. The United States pointed to Article 6 (I) of the Imemational Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966, which states: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of [hisJ life" (sic.) {Emphasis added). It thus ~ought, in a 
semantic and self-serving way, to underline the legitimacy of the taking of life in legitimate warfare. Lac, cit., at 
Note 9, p.44. 
'
16 Loc. cU., at Note 9, p.47. 
47 Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter provides that: 
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or usc of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations". 
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Such a conflation of nuclear and conventional weapons reveals a fundamental 
contradiction for the nuclear weapon States when they seek, in terms of nuclear deterrence 
doctrine, to differentiate qualitatively between the two. 
2.2.5. INTERIM SUMMARY. 
In summary, the nuclear weapon States submitted that the Court should exercise its 
discretion, and decline to give a reply to the request of the General Assembly.48 
However, should the Court reject that assertion, it should nevertheless conclude that 
there is no general prohibition in customary or conventional international law against the use 
of nuclear weapons, and that their prohibition under the law of armed conflict would depend 
on insupportable speculation as to its applicability in an abstract or hypothetical future 
situation. 
3. ARGUMENT LED BY STATES FOR THE ILLEGALITY OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 
These States contended, firstly, that the General Assembly was competent to request 
an Advisory Opinion, that the Court was competent to comply, and that it should exercise its 
discretion to do so.49 
As to the substance of their arguments, and in contrast with the congruence of 
arguments led by the declared nuclear weapon States, those of the non~nuclear weapon States 
unsurprisingly exhibited a degree of divergence of approach which reflects their own 
diversity. 
4R Supra, Notes 6 and 7. 
49 For example, the Written Observations of the Solomon Islands, 19 June 1995, contends that the request fulfils 
the requirements of Article 96 of the UN Charter, being a "legal question", and that the pennissive nature of 
Article 65 of the Statute of the Court (the enabling provision for Advisory Opinions) should not be invoked, 
having regard for the non-binding nature of the Opinion, its practical significance, the strict judicial function of 
the Court, and the Court's practice of responding positively to requests seeking legal enlightenment. At pp. 6-
22. Loc. cir., Ch. II, at Note 20. Refer to Appendices I and 2. 
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With the notable exception of the Netherlands, 5° lhey presented a collective view that 
there are no circumstances in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons may be permitted in 
international law. 
For analytical purposes, the arguments of States may be divided between: 
(a.) Those, of which Australia is representative, which sought to show that nuclear 
weapons are, by their nature, illegal in customary international law (and, hence, that it is 
unnecessary to address the circumstances of their use, and the applicable law, as separate and 
discrete issues),51 and 
(b.) Those, exemplified by the Solomon lslands,52 which engaged in a wide-ranging 
and complex survey of the obligations, rules and practices of international law in order to 
deny the legality of these weapons, both per se and in terms of their use. 
3.1. ILLEGALITY PER SE. 
Australia submitted its belief that the inherent illegality of nuclear weapons in 
customary international law leads to the conclusion that it is also illegal to acquire, test or 
possess them. It argued that, as a consequence, an obligation exists for all States to move 
towards their total elimination, but within an interim framework of stable deterrence. 53 
Australia's central proposition was that the most directly relevant principles in the 
question before the Court were those embraced by humanitarian law. 54 The threat or use of 
nuclear weapons, in view of their nature, their ability to annihilate Mankind, and the 
50 Observations of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Written Statement to the Court, 16 June 
1995, which follow the United States in terms both of the Court's discretion to hear the Case, and the findings it 
was open to hold. Ibid. 
51 Oral Statement on behalf of Australia by the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, The 
Hague, 30 October 1995. Personal communication to this author. 
52 Supra, Note 49. 
53 Loc. cit., at Note 51, pp. I ,2. 
54 Ibid., p. 3. Australia asserted that the jurisprudence of the Court has recognised these "fundamental 
principles" in, for example, the Coifu Channel Case, [ /.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4] in which the Court referred to 
"certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity". These 
principles may be broader than any existing treaty provision (in, for example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions). 
See also Note 29, supra. 
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probability of their proliferation were, in the modem era, contrary to those principles, and 
thus to customary international law ,55 
Furthennore, the progressive restrictions on the manufacture, acquisition, 
deployment, testing and military use of nuclear weapons since 194556 were evidence of 
international atlempts ultimately to eliminate them as fundamentally inhumane and 
inconsistent with the dictates of public conscience. Taken together with the many 
condemnatory General Assembly resolutions,57 Australia assert~d that these instruments 
serve to extend the illegality of nuclear weapons, a principle since 1945 de lege ferenda, to 
one with the status of lex lata. 
Australia supported its assertions with reference to the developing conventional (and 
customary) international law of non-derogable human rights, together with the "international 
civilian protection law" advanced by the 1977 Protocol! to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
and the growing awareness of the environmental effects of nuclear weapons.58 
In essence, Australia soughl to show that these developments confirm the 
international community's growing abhorrence of war, and the increasingly high standards it 
uses in assessing the humanity of weapons. In turn, this must impact on the dictates of public 
conscience, and on customary international law. 59 This is a rare, and welcome, 
55 Loc. cit., at Note51, pp. 4-7. 
56 Supra, Notes 21and 22. 
51 Supra, Note 25. Australia cited the opinion of Professor Brownlie ( (1990). Principles of public international 
law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, at p.l4) that General Assembly Resolutions such as No. 1653 (XVI) of 1961 arc 
to be regarded as "law-making." in their effect. Loc. cit., at Note 51, para. 25. 
58 Loc. cit., at Note 51, pp. 9-13. The most significant instruments in international human rights and 
environmental issues arc listed at Note 43. Many other States dealt extensively with the environmental effects of 
nuclear weapons, notably the Solomon Islands. Loc. cit., at Note 49, as did several Dissenting Opinions, notably 
that of Judge Wceramantry 35 l.L.M. 809 (1996). 
59 Ibid., paras. 26, 27. For the significance of Australia's usc of the phrase "dictntes of public conscience" sec 
Chapter II, Scction2.2.3. in regard to the "Martens Clauses" used in international humanitarian law. 
Supra, at Note 31. The seminal provisions of Additional Protocol! to the Gene1•a Convemions, now regarded, 
in Australia's submission, by the bulk of the international community a~ renecting customary international law, 
are: 
Article 51 (4) prohibiting "indiscriminate attacks", including: 
.... an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
Article 54 (2) providing that a State Party may not: 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural arcus for the production of foodstuffs, crops, live-
-stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose 
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acknowledgment of rising absolute standards of morality within the development of 
international law. 
Australia concluded its Oral Submission with an appraisal of the illegality of the 
possession of nuclear weapons, together with ti1e obligation of States to eliminate them.60 As 
with other weapons of mass destruction (biological and chemical) their very existence 
offended fundamental principles of humanity.61 Like them, prohibition against their threat or 
use must be guaranteed through their destruction, and through prohibition against their 
acquisition and possession. 
In Australia's view, the forum most effective for these practical refonns must be the 
1968 Nuclear Non~proliferation Treaty, specifically its disarmament provisions under 
Article VI 62 and, by implication, its acceptance of deterrence, and the differential treatment 
of nuclear and non~nuclear weapon States as continuing principles of international law. 
3.2ILLEGALITY IN THREAT OR USE. 
The Written Statement of Nauru is an exemplar of the many States which addressed 
the various principles and rules of international law to show that nuclear weapons are illegal 
in all circumstanccs.63 
Focussing on the jus ad bellum, Nauru pointed to the following sources of law to 
support its contention that threats, or use of force are contrary to law: 
(a.) United Nations Charter, Article 2 (4).64 
(b.) United Nations Resolutions and Declarations. 65 
of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or the adverse Party. 
60 Loc. cit., at Note 51, pp. 13-24. 
61 Supra, at Note 19. 
62 Article VI states: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures in relation to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control". 79 U.N.T.S. 161. The implications of the Opinion for the NPT will be discussed at Chapter V. 
63 Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Nauru, 15 June 1995. Loc. cit., Ch. ll, at Note 20. 
64 Ibid., p.3. supra, at Note 47. Article 2 (4) specifically prohibits the threat or usc of force. The only exception 
is in individual or collective self-defence, which includes Security Council enforcement measures under Article 
51 of the Charter. 
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(c.) Collective Security Treaties.66 
(d.) The Nuremberg Principles.61 
(e.) Opinio Juris on the nature of a threat.68 
The Written Statement of the Solomon Islands enlarged on the above in its 
concentration on the proposition that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is subject and 
contrary to the international Jaw of armed conflict, the jus in bello, having regard for the 
nature of the effects of their use, and irrespective of the circumstances in which they are 
d 69 use . 
This extensive and fine~grained review of the customary and conventional 
humanitarian law of nations,70 and of the wider laws of war,71 argued forcefully that the 
quantitative and qualitative destructive effects of the detonation of nuclear devices are such 
that they are rendered illegal in terms of: 
65 Ibid., at Note 63, p.7. supra, at Note 57. Malaysia (Written Statement of Malaysia, 19 June 1995) lists 101 
General Assembly resolutions between 1946 and 1994 seeking, in general, an end to the threat of nuclear 
weapons. Their law-creating eff'!cts arc contested by the nuclear weapon States. Loc. cit., Ch. II, at Note 20. 
6
r' Ibid., at Note 63, p.9. Collective security treaties such as the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty arc symbolic of the 
obligation to refrain from the threat or usc of force. 63 Stat. 2241; T.I.A.S. No. 1964; 4 Bevans 828; 34 U.N.T.S. 
243 ( 1949) Art. I. 
67 Ibid., Note 63, at p.IO. The International Law Commission has codified "the principles of international law 
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal" as: 
(i.) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation .,f inter-
-national treaties, agreements or assurances, and 
(ii.) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts 
mentioned under (i).abovc. 
Boyle has stated that these principles "have since been universally considered to constitute an authoritative 
statement of the rules of customary international law". Boyle, F. (1986). The relevance of international law to 
the "paradox" of nuclear deterrence. Nw. U.L. Rev, 80 (6), 1407-1448, at 1416. 
68 Supra, Section 2.2.4; Ibid., at Note 63, pp. 22, 23, 31. Nauru asserted that the concepts of "threat" and "use" 
in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter merge in most circumstance. Thus, threat of use is itself a kind of usc, when 
" 'threat' is defined as a declaration to inflict punishment. . .in retaliation for, or condi!ional\y upon some action 
or course. An indication of probable ... violencc to come." In any event, a threat to commit an i\legal act is also 
illegal as a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations. 
69 Supra, at Note 49. 
7° Codified, inter alia, in Regulations annexed to the !907 Hagtte Convention IV, and the 1977 Additional 
Protocols I and II to the !949 Geneva Conventions. Loc. cit., at Note 29. 
71 For example, the jus ad bellum customary principles of neutrality and reprisal, and !he 1948 Cn11vention on 
the Preventio11 and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [78 U.N. T.S. 2771. 
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(a.) The limitation on the choice of means of attacking the enemy.72 
(b.) The obligation to discriminate between combatants and civilians.73 
(c.) The prohibition against attacking civilian targets.74 
(d.) The prohibition against the use of poisons, or weapons having indiscriminate 
effects.75 
(e.) The prohibition against the use of weapons which render death inevitable or 
f ' . 76 cause unnecessary su 1ermg. 
(f.) The prohibition against violating the territorial integrily and neutrality of third 
States.77 
(g.) The prohibition against causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment.78 
(h.) The obligation to respect the principles of proportionality and humanity.79 
12 Supra, at Note 29. 
73 Supra, at Note 31. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Supra, at Notes 29 and 33. Artielc 51 (4). (5) of Additional Protocol! to the Geneva Convemiorrs. Article 51 
(5) (b) prohibits the usc of an indiscriminate wcapo11 causing incidental loss to civilian life or objects which is 
excessive in relation to any anticipated military advantage. 
76 Ibid. (In tenns of the provisions of the Sr. Petersburg Decfr.ration of 1868). 
77 Articles 2 ( 4) and 74 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
78 The general obligation to avoid trans-boundary environmental damage is reflected in the dicta of t~je Trail 
Smelter arbitration [United States v. Canada, 3 R.l.A.A., p.l907, (1938 and 1941)]. More recent conventional 
instruments arc listed supra, at Note 43. 
79 Supra, at Notes 32 and 54. The Caroline Case established the requirement that actions in self-defence must 
be necessary and proportionate to the seriousness and danger of the attack defended. (Harris, D. J. (1991). 
Cases and materials in international law. (rev. cd.). London: Sweet & Maxwell). [29 B.F.S.P. 1137-1138; 
B.F.S.P. 195-196). 
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(i). The prohibition against genocide, or crimes against humanity.80 
The above, it is submitted, represents a comprehensive taxonomy of the international 
law applicable in anned conflict, and particularly international humanitarian law. It is also a 
powerful exposition of the legal incommensurability of the positions of those States with 
nuclear weapons, and those without. 
3.3 SUMMARY. 
This selective review of the Pleadings of States has served to establish the range of 
argument led for and against the question before the Court. It remains, in the substantive 
component of the thesis, to examine the individual Opinions of Judges. 
It will then be possible, as indicated in the Introduction to this Chapter, to assess the 
strengths and deficiencies of the Court's Opinion. 
80 Supra, at Note 67. Sec also Section 2.2.2. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE OPINION EVALUATED. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
A review of the Opinions of individual Judges will complete an examination of the 
extent of fact, and of applicable law available to the Court, enabling a range of nonnative 
judgments concerning the comprehensiveness, coherence and jurisprudential continuity of 
the Opinion. 
2. DISSENTING AND OTHER OPINIONS. 
As previously noted, all fourteen Judges appended individual Opinions or Statements 
to the Court's Judgment. In general terms, they confined their remarks to the material 
presented before the Court, and did not seek to introduce substantially novel perspectives or 
interpretations to the application of relevant law to available fact. 1 
However, a sample of individual Opinions from Judges who voted on each side of 
the question, while instructive, is anomalous to the extent that several Judges appear to have 
held views at odds, in some degree, with their recorded votes.2 Nevertheless, and whatever 
1 This is an example of the unsurprising juridical caution of the International Court of Justice. Nagendra Singh, 
a former President of the Court, has stated, significantly, that the Court must, in his view, acknowledge the 
principle )11ra novit curia. Nevertheless, it is limited in its ability to contribute to the progressive development 
of international law through the need to guard its judicial integrity by not anticipating the law before it is laid 
down by legislators. Judgments sub specie legis ferenda would violate the essential canons of adjudication. 
(Singh, N. ( 1989). The role and record of the lmernational Court of Justice. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, at 
pp. 174-5). 
2 This may be a consequence of the complex internal arrangements used by the Court in the development of a 
Judgment which represents the majority view of its members. In general terms, these procedures aim 
progressively to develop a Judgment which will attract majority support in the Court (whose member Judges 
must, as a coll~gial court, bear joint responsibility for its jurisprudence). They arc outlined by Singh (Op. cit., at 
Note I, pp. 383-5). 
The most striking example is contained in President Bedjaoui's Declaration. Although he voted in favour of 
operative paragraph: 105 (2) E, he was constrained to state: " .... the Court's inability to go beyond the 
conclusion it reached cannot in any manner be interpreted as having opened the door to the recognition of the 
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their final decision, each individual Judge brought to the collegiate Advisory Opinion a 
complexity of judicial argument and relevant law which, as obiter dicta, enlarges and 
explains it. 
For example, Judge Oda, in his Dissenting Opinion, was concerned to point out that 
principles of judicial propriety and economy should have led the Court to decline to give an 
Opinion. 3 He contended that the question was political in nature, more suited to negotiation 
between States in Geneva or New York than in a curial setting at The Hague, and that the 
Opinion had the potential to damage the Court's credibility with the international 
community.4 Significantly, he went on to place the Opinion withi11 the context of the 1968 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and the continuing failure to conclude a Convention 
prohibiting any use or threat of use cf nuclear weapons.5 
Several Judges emphasised the fact that, for the first time, the Court had stated 
unambiguovsly that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the international law 
of armed conflict, and particularly to the principles and rules of humanitarian law. 6 Others 
indicated that the natural right of a State to self-defence cannot be denied by the United 
Nations Charter, nor by any conventional or customary rule. As a consequence, resort to 
nuclear weapons in extremis cannot be denied in law.7 
Judge Weeramantry, in an extensive and discursive review of law and fact, concluded 
that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was illegal in any circumstances whatsoever, 
being the very negation of the humanitarian concerns lying at the heart of humanitarian law. 
legality of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons." (AI para. II). President Bcdjaoui took the view that the 
Court's dispositifwas the inevitable result of its application of the law as it is today (At para.9, both in French). 
Of those seven Judges who, with President Bedjaoui's casting vote, fanned the majority in favour of the 
operative paragraph of this judgment (105 (2) E ), Judges Herczegh, Ferrari Bravo and Ranjeva disapproved, in 
varying degree, with the thrust of that paragraph, and said as much in their respective Separate Opinion and 
Declarations. Conversely, of those voting against, three (Schwebel, Guillaume and Higgins), according to their 
individual Opinions, appeared to be fundamentally in favour of the implications of that paragraph. 35 I.L.M. 
809 (1996). Condorelli, L. (1997). Nuclear weapons: a weighty matter for the International Court of Justice. 
lnten;ational Revie\V of the Red Cross, 37. (I), 9-20, at 10. 
3 Available fan line] at http:f/www.dfat.gov.aulild/icj-nuc/oda-a.html, at paras. 47-54. 
4 Ibid., para. 52. 
5 Ibid., at Note 3, Parts I and II; Chapter III, at Note 21. [79 U.N. T.S. 161] Although Judge Oda concurred with 
the nuclear weapons States, in that he believed no Opinion should have been given, he nonetheless voted 
against the operative Paragraph 105 (2) E of the dispositif. 
6 35/.L.M. 809 (1996). Judges Weeramantry, Koroma, Ranjeva and Vereschctin were among those held this to 
be the case. 
7 Ibid. Judge Guillaume, Individual Opinion, Paragraph 8. 
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He undertook a comprehensive discussion of the scientific and technical effects of the 
detonation of fission and fusion devices on human beings and their environment, and 
applauded the Court's acknowledgment of the relevance of nuclear weapons to the 
environmental strictures of the 1977 Additional Protocol/ to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.8 
Again, Vice-President Schwebel expressed his opinion that the use of nuclear 
weapons did not necessarily violate humanitarian law in extreme cases of self-defence, even 
though "the deaths of many millions of people through indiscriminate inferno and far-
reaching fallout" could not be accepted as lawful.9 
In short, the views of individual Judges of the Court, as expressed in their Dissenting 
and other Opinions, echoed lhe widely divergent views of States represented before it, but 
did not (with the exception of the principle of extreme self~defence) seek to introduce 
elements of law which had not previously formed a part of the jurisprudence of the Court. 
3. THE OPINION REVIEWED. 
It is now possible, in light of the material set out in the Opinion itself, the Pleadings 
of States before the Court, and the Dissenting and other Opinions and Statements of 
individual Judges, to fonn conclusions concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Advisory Opinion. 
The Opinion appears, prima facie, as a compromise between two incommensurate 
positions. In its dispositif, the Court found, firstly, that it could fmd no specific authorisation 
for the threat or use of nuclear weapons in customary nor conventional law (as contended by 
those States without such weapons). 10 Conversely, it could find no "comprehensive nor 
8 Ibid., at Note 6. Judge Wccramantry, Dissenting Opinion, Part II. Sec also his Appendix, Sections (a.), and 
(b.) (in relation to Paragraph 3 I of the Court's Opinion. Additional Protocol!, Articles 35 (3) and 55). Judge 
Wceramrmtry's Dissenting Opinion is a careful refutation of each argument advanced by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France in support of their position, touching on deterrence, reprisals, internal wars, the 
doctrine of necessity, discriminatory nuclear weapons, and the relevance of the Nuclear Norl·proliferation 
Treaty in an 88 page Dissent. Weiss, P. (1996). Notes on a misunderstood decision: the World Court's near 
perfect Adliisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapon Case. Unpublished paper. International Association of 
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms: New York. 
9 International Court of Justice Communique No. 96/23 ( 1996, 8 July). Legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons. (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations): Adliisory Opinion. 
Annex, at p.5. 
10 Lnc. cit., at Note 6. Paragraph 105 (2) A of the Advisory Opinion. Decided unanimously. 'Ific precise text of 
the Court's dispmitifmay be found at Chapter II, Section 2.1. 
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universal" prohibition within the same sources, as asserted by the declared nuclear weapon 
States. 11 
Thirdly, it found, unanimously, that any threat or use of force involving nuclear 
weapons in violation of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits such 
action "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" is unlawful. It 
found the same to be true in terms of a threat or use of force which did not meet the self-
defence requirements of Article 51 of the Charter. 12 
Fourthly, and unanimously, it found that any such action should comply with the 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law (emphasis added), and with the terms 
of the lex special is of conventional instruments specific to nuclear weapons. 13 
Finally, in the operative Paragraph of the Opinion, and by the narrowest of simple 
majorities, the Court found, following from the above, that a threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the mle.; of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law (emphasis added). 
It attempted to enlarge on its caveat by concluding its Judgment with a non liquet, in 
which it averred its inability, given the current state of international law, and of the elements 
of fact at its disposal, to conclude definitively whether such action would be lawful or 
unlawful in a circumstance of self-defence which threatened the survival of a State. 14 It may 
be observed here parenthetically that this final holding can be construed as a concession to 
11 Ibid., Paragraph 105 (2) B. By !!Ieven votes to three. Judges Shahabuddecn, Wccramantry nnd Koroma 
demurred. 
12 Ibid., Paragraph 105 (2) C. The United Kingdom asserted that the usc of force is not prohibited by Article 2 
(4) if it is authorised by n competent organ of the United Nations {presumably the Security Council), or if it is 
undertaken in the exercise of self-defence as defined by Article 51. Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 
p.34, para. 3.33. 
0 Ibid., Paragraph 105 (2) D. The usc of "should" rather than "must" tends to mitigotc the slrcngth nf this 
finding, since "should" has, as ils mos\ common meaning in modern English, the sense "ought to" rather !han 
anylhing stronger. Collins E,tglish Dictionary (1990). (rev. ed.). London: Harper Collins. This is capable of 
construal as an a\tcmpt to accommodate two irreconcilable positions in respect of the relevance of humanitarian 
Jaw. 
14 Ibid., Paragraph I 05 {2) E. Those Judges in favour: President Bcdjaoui (Algeria); Judges Ranjcvn 
{Mnlagasy); Herczcgh (Hungary); Shi (China); Fleischhaucr {Germany); Vcrcschetin (Russia) and Fcrrari-
Bravo (Italy). 
Those against: Vice-President Schwebel (United Stntes); Judges Oda (Japa11); Guillaume (France); 
Shnhabuddccn (Guyana); Wceramantry {Sri Lanka); Koroma (Sierra Leone) and Higgins (United Kingdom). 
The fifteenth position on the Bench was vacnnt, following the death of Judge Aguihr-Mawdslcy {Venezuela) in 
November 1995. He was replaced by Judge Parra-Aranguren {Vcne7.llcla), who was clcctct.i in Fcb;·,~nry I99fi. 
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nuclear weapon States, and to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. It may also be seen as 
lending precedence to the survival of a single State over that of the rest of humanity. 
3.1. EVALUATION OF THE OPINION. 
What, then, are the strengths and weaknesses of the Opinion? As noted above, it is 
capable of interpretation by the nuclear weapon States as acknowledgment of their general 
position with regard to nuclear weapons: that there are foreseeable circumstances in which a 
use of nuclear weapons in war would not be illegal. By the same token, the Court's 
perplexing inability to declare such an action illegal in all cases without exceptiml may be 
interpreted as a significant rebuff to the rest of the international community. 
3.1.1. THE COURT'S DICTA. 
The Opinion's greatest strength may be its dicta, expressed in Paragraphs 79 and 85, 
that the body of international humanitarian law contained in major conventions is, in 
essence, general and customary international law, and that it applies to nuclear weapons in 
the same way as to any other weapon. 15 
Paragraph 79 states: 
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable 
in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and 
"elementary considerations of humanity" as the Court put it in its Judgment 
of 9th April I 949 in the Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. Reports I 949. p.22), that 
the Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further 
these fundamental rules arc to be observed by all States whether or not they 
have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intra-
-nsgressible principles of international customary law. 16 
Condorclli notes that the expression "intransgressible principles of international law" 
seems to suggest that the Court was attempting by its jurisprudence to bring the status of 
15 Humanitarian law is understood here as a sub-division of the jus in bello. 
16 Loc, cit., at Note 6, 
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humanitarian law closer to jus cogens, while not attempting its inclusion within that 
domain. 17 As will be discussed in Chapter V, this result has far·reaching implications for the 
legal status of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and for the doctrine of deterrence 
in international law. 
A second important characteristic of the Opinion is its treatment of the distinction 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 18 It is possible to read paragraph 105 (2) E of the 
disposit{f (paraphrased above) as discriminating between the two when, by well established 
principle and custom, they have equal status, and must both be satisfied before a use of force 
is lawful. In other words, necessary and proportionate self-defence by means prohibited in 
humanitarian law would be unlawful. 
It appears that the Court has, by its non liquet, allowed the possibility that a use of 
nuclear weapons (which, it is submitted, would violate the humanitarian components of jus 
in bello) could, in undefined circumstances, be justified by a principle of jus ad bellum (that 
of extreme self-defence). 19 There is room here for concern about the negative impact of this 
17 Supra, nt Note 2, p. 17. At Paragraph 83, the Court declined to rule on the jus co gens nature of humnnitnrinn 
lnw since the question of its legal chnmctcr, per .re. wns not nt issue. 
18 The jus ad be !fum comprises, in the modern era, the principles of lnwful self-defence against unlawful 
aggression embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Its origin is found in the medieval principle of "just 
war", ns further developed by Grotius in the curly pnrt of the Seventeenth Century. Its focus, in order to impose 
limits on a State's ability to resort to war, was plnccd principa!ly on the authority nnd state of mind of the 
person declaring war, the condition and intentions of tho~c waging war, the justice of the cnusc of war, and the 
deserts of those against whom it was wllgcd. Kingsbury, B., & Roberts, A. (1992). Introduction: Grotian 
thought in international rel;~tions. In H. Bull, B. Kingsbury & A. Rob1:rts (Eds.), Hugo Grotius and 
international relations (pp. 20-21 ). Oxford: Clorendon Press. 
The jus in bello addresses the means by which war JTillY be pursued, and encompasses the principles of 
humanitarian Jaw applicable in war; the Hague nnd Geneva Conventions, Protocols and Regulations, and other 
instruments which codify customary low (and more directly so, in view of the present Advisory Opinion). 
19 Greenwood has plllyed down the signilicance of this apparent disjunction, which would, he asserts, threaten a 
return to a Grotian conception of just war in plnce of the United Nations Charter provisions on use of force. He 
does not concede the proposition that all usc of nuclear weapons would transgress humanitarian law. 
Greenwood, C. (1997). The Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons and the contribution of the International 
Court to international humanitarian law. Loc. cit., at Note 2, 65-75. 
The opposite view is put cogently by Judge Shahllbuddeen, who, noting that the Court has recognised that the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons, unrestroincd in splice or time, noncthclc5s is overborne in its judgment 
by the principle of resort to self-defence, or "State survival", stated: 
It would ... seem curious thnt a World Court should consider itself t'ompcllcd by law to reach the 
conclu:.ion thnt a state hns the legal right, even in limited circumstllnce, to put the planet to dcllth ..... 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddecn, PnrtiV: "Conclusion", at p. 29. We. cit., at Note 2). 
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equivocation on the Court'~ standing in the international community. Such an outcome 
would be regrettable, especially as the result of its putative, and surprising, inability to 
ascertain the law applicable to a case before it. 
Nevertheless, that may be the consequence of the devel0prnent of the Court's 
jurisprudence through the evolution of the entirely new principle of the survival of a State 
which, it may be argued, is a retrograde step for a Court which completed its Judgment with 
a call for comprehensive nuclear disannament.20 It also calls into question the regime of self-
defence enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. 
While it is undeniably "the job of the Court ... to apply the law as it is."21 it must 
also, in Nagendra Singh's words, be "very careful and selective of the time and the 
circ~;:;-<;tances in which it could proceed to look to the developmental aspect of the law it 
administers" _I?.. This may be one occasion on which the Court has over-stepped the bounds of 
prudence, and is a second negative aspect of the Opinion. 
A more basic criticism, and one discussed by Judge Koroma in his Dissenting 
Opinion,23 concerns its focus on the nature of the legal matter before it. The Court was asked 
whether it is lawful to use nuclear weapons, and not about the juridical priority to be 
assigned to the survival of a State. In Judge Koroma's words; " ... the Court flinched and 
failed to reach the only and inescapablr finding" [that the usc of nuclear weapons is 
prohibited in all circumstances by the rules of humanitarian law ].24 
Further notable dicta in the Opinion are derived from its treatment of international 
human rights and environmental law. While neither was held to be substantively decisive in 
the Court's deliberations, nonetheless, both domains of law were relevant to its reasoning, 
and both were strengthened by the Opinion.25 
It will be recalled that the United States and the United Kingdom were dismissive of 
the relevance of each domain to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 26 Other States, such as 
20 Pamgraph I 05 (2) F of the Court's dispositif. Loc. cit., at Note 2. 
21 Supra, at Note 19, p.75. See also Note I, 
22 Loc. cit., at Note I, p. 175. 
23 Loc. cit., at Note 2, pp. 4 , 18. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Some of the most important international conventional instruments in the lields of human rights and the 
environment are listed at Chapter III, Note 43. 
26 Chapter III, at Section 2.2.3. 
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the Solomon Islands and Egypt, held that a nonMderogable right to life exists at all times in 
terms of international human rights instruments,27 and that the many treaties aimed at the 
protection of human health and the environment have attracted such widespread accession as 
now to reflect rules of customary law .28 
The Court addressed the relevance of the right to life at Paragraphs 24 and 25 of its 
Opinion and, while affirming that human rights law continues to apply in war, went on to 
place the test of what constitutes "arbitrary deprivation of life" for determination in terms of 
"the law applicable in armed conflict, which is designed to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities".29 In other words, human rights rules are to be interpreted in terms of 
humanitarian law, bringing them ftrmly within that domain in the context of armed conflict. 
This is a significant advance for the status of human rights rules generally, and in particular 
h . I . h 1·' 311 t e umvcrsa ng t to I1C." 
As for environmental law, the Opinion has strengthened greatly its emerging status as 
a body of rules which, given the wide adoption of the 1992 Rio Declaration, must now be 
taken seriously into account when action is contemplated which would conflict with its 
~l<r:•Jres. 3 t 
27 Cf Article 6 (I), lntematinnal Cm·enant on Cil'il and Political Rights, 1966 [999 U.N.T.S. 171). Wriuen 
Comment!> of Egypt on Other Wrillen Statements, September, 1995, at pp. 27, 28, in which Egypt noted that 
this Article provides : 
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by Jaw. 
No one shall he arbitrarily deprived of [his] life [sic]. 
It also cited Article 40 of the Fo11rth Geneva Convention, 1949 [75 U.N. T.S. 287], which states "[i]t is 
~rohibited to order that there shall be no survivors". Loc. cit., Ch. Ill, at Note 20. 
8 Ibid. Written Observations of Solomon Islands, 20 June 1995, at p.86. paras. 4.21-4.30 .. This view renects 
the position of the "revolutionist" or Kantian theorists of internntional relations; those who chnmpion the 
tmnscendcnce of individun!s ns the superior moral and political agents in the world. Such a position is a basic 
premise of the international law of human rights. A broad discussion of this vital area of the legal and 
philosophical sub~structurc of human rights can be found in: Shcstak, J. 1. ( 1985). The jurisprudence of human 
rights. InT. Mcron (Ed.), /fa man rights in international law. (pp. 69- II~). Oxford: O.U.P. 
29 Loc. cit., at Note 2, para. 25. 
30 One commentator has drawn attention to the fact that such a conflation of rT>~~ iwo spheres of law is less 
comfortable when associated with the rights of those in the custody of an "authvriry'. Here, human rights treaty 
bodies have tended to ignore the Geneva Conventions, and applied the human rights texts within their own 
terms. Doswald-Beck, L. ( 1997). International humanitarian law and the Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons. Loc. cit., nt Note 2. 35~55, at 52. 
31 [UN. Doc. A/CONF. 151/Rev.l]. In addition to environmental law instrument~. per se, the ter'll 
"environmental law" is used here to include those provisions of Geneva Law which regulate the eftCcts of 
conflict on the natural environment, such as Article 35, paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol /, 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and conventional law having the same effect (such as the 1977 Convention on the 
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This principle is clear when the Court states: 
The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international 
law relating to the environment. 32 
The Court emphasised the fact that environmental treaties could not have been 
intended to deprive a State of its right of self-defence, but that they must be taken into 
account when assessing whether "an action is in confonnity with the principles of necessity 
and proportionality" .:n 
In summary, then, the Opinion has considerable merit in terms of its enunciation of 
dicta whose effect is to strengthen and extend the reach of international humanitarian, human 
rights and environmental law, both customary and conventional, in their application to the 
international law of armed conflict. 
These advances are tempered by the Court's confusing treatment of the relationship 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, its finding of a non liquet on a question which it had 
not been asked to address, and its "legislative" development of a principle of extreme 
circumstances of self-defence involving the survival of the State. 
This last criticism, as noted above, has wide ramifications for the entire regime of 
self-defence in the international community and, most importantly, must be seen in light of 
the status of the doctrine of deterrence in its relationship to customary and conventional 
international law. Indeed, lhe issues surrounding this question lie at the heart of the Opinion 
and its significance for nuclear disarmament. 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. [ 1125 U.N. T.S. 3] 
). 
32 UH:. cit,, at Note 2, paragraph 29. 
33/bid., paragraph 30. Doswald-Bcck has pointed to the ambiguity c>f the reference to "necessity and 
proportionality", which the Court may have intended as a reference to this principle in the general context of the 
law of self-defence, or alternatively to the principle of proportionality of collateral damage in humanit<~rian law. 
If the latter, she contends, this means, in effect, that "environment" is a "civilian object", the damage to which 
must be proportionate to the value of a military objective. Tbis argument appears redundant to the extent that it 
seems unnecessary to extend the scope or range of "civilian objects", in the sense of artefacts and service 
providers, already afforded protection by "Geneva Law". Ibid., at Note 30. 
--------------- --- ---
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3.1.2. COHERENCE OF ARGUMENT IN THE OPINION. 
The coherence of the reasoning and argument presented in the text of the Opinion 
should be understood with reference to the evidence of fact before the Court, and of the 
relevant law available for application to that evidence. 
In generai terms, the deficiencies apparent in the raciocination and analyses made by 
the Court are all the more perplexing when viewed against the Opinion in toto. There is no 
doubt that the Court uildressed the broad span of spheres or domains of law which might 
apply to a question concerning the legality of a threat or use of force employing a weapon of 
mass destruction. It had been addressed at length on the question by 43 States in written 
statements, and by 23 of those States in oral submissions. 34 Its own jurisprudence, that of its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the composition of its 
distinguished Bench combined to ensure that such was the case.35 However, when viewed at 
the level of specific applicable law, anomalous and contradictory reasoning begins to appear. 
The Court began with a convincing discussion of its jurisdiction, and of its discretion 
to hear the matter. An examination of its Statute, and an extensive review of the Court's 
jurisprudence, led it with little difficulty to a positive conclusion.36 
It moved on to consider relevant law, visiting each of the substantive arguments of 
States for and against the applicability of a wide range of international law norms,37 and 
identifying (apparently without consulting its own jurisprudence) the United Nations Charter 
provisions on the usc of force, the law of am1ed conflict, and specific treaties on nuclear 
weapons as the law most relevant to the question posed. 
There is little with which to take issue tc this point. However, when it approached 
more closely each area of law, the Opinion's flow of reasoning became less certain. For 
example, its examination of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed 
34 Mohr, M. (1997). Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the usc of nuclear 
weapons under international law. Loc. cit., al Note 2, 92-J02, at 94. 
JS These comments arc intended lo indicate the general comprehensiveness of the text of the Opinion, ralher 
than that of the individual opinions, or alternative commentaries, of Judges, which vary greatly in length and 
thoroughness. The text of the Opinion is summarised at Chapter II, Section 2 
36 Loc. cit., at Note 2. Paragraphs JO- 19 of the Opinion. 
37 Ibid., Paragraphs 23 - 34 of the Opinion. The general taxonomy in this regard consisted of: international 
human rights law, prohibitions against genocide, internalional environmental Jaw, Uniled Nations Charter 
provisions on the usc of force, the Jaw of armed conflict, and specific treaties dealing with nuclear weapons. 
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conflict is both comprehensive and rigorous.38 However, its conclusion, at Paragraph 95, that 
the use of nuclear weapons was "scarcely reconcilable with respect for [the requirements of 
international humanitarian law]" is followed by the observation that: 
Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements 
to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would 
necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in 
anned conflict in any circumstance (emphasis added). 
What is lacking in this instance is any indication of the circumstances which would 
allow the lawful use of nuclear weapons.39 The Court, lacking sufficient information with 
which to judge the best position, on either side of the question, would have been better 
served had it been swayed by its own argument as to incommensurability of principles of 
humanity and the detonation of nuclear devices. 
The reluctance of the Court to follow the lines of its argument to their most logically 
defensible conclusion is reflected in the non liquet of the second limb of the operative 
Paragraph of the dispositif. While the practical consequences of the Opinion's non-finding 
may be apparent to all interested parties, nonetheless it appears open to hold that, given the 
legal and factual tools at its disposal, the Court's apparently disabled jurisprudence lacks 
coherence. It is simply not supported by the text which leads to its terms.40 
Of the many altemative ways of establishing this conclusion, perhaps the most 
cogent, given the central position of humanitarian law in the Opinion, is to indicate, with 
respect, the manner in which the Court could have approached its treatment of this area of 
law. 
It had first to determine whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is lawful in 
relation to the humanitarian law protecting combatants, and then to address that which 
protects civilians in war. This is a vital first step in any analysis, since the principle of 
JR Ibid., Paragraphs 74 -87 of the Opinion. 
39 This deficiency is echoed in the first limb of Paragraph 105 (2)E of the Court's dispositif, where the tenn 
"generally" in relation to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons in war is left without any 
explanatory addendum (or apologia). 
40 Several Judges asserted this to be the case in Dissenting Opinions. e.g. Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, al Part VI, Conclusion. 35/.L.M 809 (1996), 
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discrimination between the two is a fundamental component of international humanitarian 
law. 41 
Having done so, the Court could then have judged whether nuclear weapons cause 
suffering which is "unnecessary" in terms of the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration,42 and the 
Hague Regulations of 1907.43 
Finally, the Court would then have been in a position to address the issue of the 
claimed indiscriminate effects of nuclear weapons, which would bear upon the prohibition 
against attacking civilians if unavoidable civilian casualties were expected to result from a 
']' k 44 rru ttary attac . 
Had the Court proceeded in this way, it is difficult to believe that it would have 
reached the conclusion contained in Paragraph 95 (above). 
4. CONCLUSION. 
A selective survey of the individual opinions and statements of Judges has been used 
in conjunction with the pleadings of States, and the Opinion itself, to review and evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Opinion in terms of its dicta, the continuity of its 
jurisprudence, and the coherence of its argument. 
It remains to place the Advisory Opinion in the wider context of its importance for 
the international community of nations within the United Nations system. There can be no 
doubt that the Opinion carries great legal, political and moral significance for the prospects 
41 1977 Protocol/ to the !949 Geneva Conventions, [1 I 25 U.N. T.S. 3], states at Article 48: 
Parties to ... connie! shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objects and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives. 
" [ 138 C.T.S. (1868-69: LXIV U.K.P.P. (1869) 659]. 
43 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare annexed to !907 Hague Convention IV. [205 C.T.S. (1907) 227; 
U.K.T.S. 32 (1910) Cd. 5030]. 
44 Mohr has pointed to the fact that the principle of proportionality, per se, would not unconditionally exclude 
any recourse to nuclear weapons in self-defence (although it is very difficull to conceive of a circumstance in 
which it could sanction such use). The Court has distinguished between this principle and international 
humanitarian law (to which reference must ultimately be made in determining lawfulness), However, 
humanitarian law is itself innucnccd by the principle of proportionality, which provides its linkage to the 
Charter law of jus ad bellum. This is tantamount to conceding that aggressive use of nuclear weapons is always 
disproportionate andlbecause it is conti·ary to international humanitarian law. Lac. cit., Note 34, at 97. 
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of nuclear non-proliferation and disannament in the opening years of the Tw~~nty-first 
Century. 
From this perspective, the ways in which it affects or modulates efforts in these 
directions will be of immense importance, not only for the future standing and relevance of 
the International Court of Justice, but also for the success of international efforts to moderate 
and confine aggressive use of force through legal and moral strictures, as well as by political 
means. 
'i, 
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CHAPTERV. 
CONCLUSION: OUTCOMES. RELEVANCE AND IMPACT. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The final Chapter of the thesis will draw together the threads of argument, dispute 
and evidence in order to assert a range of implications and possible (or imputable) outcomes 
flowing from the Advisory Opinion. The breadth and depth of issues surrounding its genesis, 
direction and resolution are sure indicators of its importance on the widest international 
scale. 
With that in mind, it will focus, firstly, on the most important direct implications of 
the Court's Opinion. This will encompass some consideration of its impact on perceptions of 
the Court's judicial independence and integrity as an integral component of the United 
Nations Organisation, together with implications for the Court's ability to develop 
international law through its jurisprudence. The thesis will also consider its significance for 
the future of the regime of deterrence surrounding the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty, 1 the prospects of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and perceptions of the 
principles of self-defence in international law. 
Secondly, and in a more general or contextual sense, the thesis will consider the 
importance of the Opinion as a commentary on the post-World War II development of public 
international law, and on the plural model of international relations offered, respectively, in 
Chapters I and II. 
Finally, it will close with a general appraisal of the Opinion in terms of the alternative 
findings that were open for the Court to hold. 
1 Loc. cit., Ch. III, at Note 21. Hereafter tenned "NPT''. 
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2.1. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. 
The dual questions of the Court's integrity, and of its ability to maintain its judicial 
independence within the United Nations system, generate a range of theoretical and practical 
conundra. That does not disqualify them from consideration, not least because the present 
Opinion, as much as judgments in compulsory jurisdiction, illustrates many of the dilemmas 
faced by the Court. 
Its very nature as a collegial international court, reflecting on its Bench widely 
disparate legal, political, social and cultural systems, encourages a perception that its judges 
will discharge their duties in some nationally-determined way? Such an assertion is by no 
means obvious, although it is possible to argue that the Court's record over the past decade, 
especially concerning the continuity of its jurisprudence, indicates that politically-motivated 
pressures upon it, whether implicit or more forcefully expressed, may be growing. 
In such circumstances. it is increasingly vital, in terms of the Court's judicial 
independence, and relevance for the development of international law, that it resist with the 
full weight of its judicial, statutory and moral authority all attempts at extra-juridical 
influence from States. 
This aim was not assisted by its Judgment in the Nicaragua Case," in which, as 
Reisman has indicated, the Court used a truncated citation of its own jurisprudence in order 
to leave the impression that it was thereby entitled to reach judgment in a non-appearance 
case (pursuant to Article 53 (2) of its Statute) without satisfying itself that the applicant 
State's factual claims were well-founded. Having regard to the full extent of its 
2 Judge Manfred Lachs, a fanner President of the International Court of Justice (1973-1976}, has stated that 
judges of the Court. have, through their training, experience, impartiality and conscience, displayed a level of 
objectivity, detachment, disinterest and lack of bias which confounds the frequent claims made, especially in the 
world's press, that the J.C.J. is nothing more than a "legal" Security Council. His comments were made in the 
context of the debate among American jurists following the Nicaragua Case of 1986 [Nicaragua v. United 
States, J.C.J.Reports, 1986, p.4.]. He indicates examples of the Court's unanimous judgments to illustrate his 
point (which is reinforced by the unanimous voting recorded on all but one limb of the dis;wsitifin the present 
Opinion). While ack;ww]edging the fact that many of its detractors arc motivated by an aversion against 
allowing any foreign involvement in sovereign State interests, he emphasises the Court's primary goal of global 
representation, rather than any out-moded conception of it as "a like-minded, Western-oriented club". Lachs, 
M. (1987) A few thoughts on the independence of judges of the International Court of Justice. Col. 1. Trans. L 
25 (3), 593-600. 
3 Loc. cit., ibid., at Note 2. 
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jurisprudence, it was not so entitled.4 As discussed in Chapter IV,5 the present Opinion 
contains examples of equally impaired (and puzzling) jurisprudence. 
In the face of growing concerns for the future judicial independence and perceived 
integrity of the Court as it fulfils it remit, the premises underlying this discussion must be 
brought constantly to the fore: that the juridical resolution of legal disputes, and the Court's 
central role in that process, are fundamental to any hope for a peaceful world. All States must 
have confidence in the procedural and substantive probity of all aspects of its work.6 
2.1.1. JURISPRUDENTIAL EVOLUTION. 
The Court's most important relationship, from both a judicial and political/diplomatic 
perspective, is that with the United States.7 International legal idealism will not alter this 
reality. As a consequence, its ability to develop or direct the growth and universal influence 
of public international Jaw, especially in the domain of the use of force in international 
relations, was severely curtailed by the United States' withdrawal from the Court's 
compulsmy jurisdiction in the 1986 Nicaragua Case. 8 
4 Refer to Appendix 2. The Court, in Nicaragua, invoked the Corfu Channel Judgment {(U.K. v. Albania) l.C.J. 
Reports 1949, p.248] as l!uthority for a partial default judgment in the l!bsence of extensive questions of fact 
from the United States (which had withdrawn its limited accession to the "Optional clause" of the I.C.J. Statute 
(contained in Article 36) and absented itself from proceedings). In doing so, however, it omiltcd to cite its 
coterminous dicta thm, in satisfying itself that the applicant State's claim is well-founded, it should have resort 
to methods different from those the absent defendant might have used. Reisman, W. M. (1989). Respecting 
one's own jurisprudence: A plea to the International Court of Justice. 83 A.J.l,L. 312 (1989). At 312-314. 
5 At Section 3.!.2. 
6 Gordon has described the Court's character in the following way: 
The Court is unique: a hybrid of arbitral tribunl!l, legal adviser and court of law; of trial and 
appellate court; of "principle judicial mgan" of the United Nations and autonomous adjudicative 
body; of civil law and common law formalities and techniques; of diplomacy and law. Its jurisdiction 
is not so muc.ll prescribed by constitution or statute, as it is created, in effect, by contract with and 
among the parties ... [as] independent states ..... virlul!!ly every case the Court hears is of a 
"political" nature .... , 
Gordon, E. (1987). Legal disputes under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. In L.F. Damrosch (Ed.), The 
International Court of Justice at a crossroads (pp.l83-222). Dobbs Ferry: American Society of International 
Law. At p.l85. This hints at the undo,Jbted importance of non-judicial methods of dispute resolution, such as 
negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation and arbitration in universal U.N. or regional fora. 
7 Not least in view of its predominance over the administrative and financial functions of the United Nations 
Organisation, of which the I.C.J. is a component. 
8 Loc cit., at Note 2. On 8 October 1985 the United States withdrew its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction 
under its "Optional Clause" Declaration in terms of Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court. It offered the 
following explanation: 
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America's subsequent ambivalence and caution in several contentious cases9 has, it is 
submitted, continued in the present Opinion. As its written and oral statements show, the 
United States displayed a cautious, legally conservative (and, paradoxically, functionalist) 
approach to its evidence on this most fundamental of questions. 10 
Until confidence in the impartiality and utility of the Court m a politically and 
socially divided world is engendered in, or returns to, the governments of the world's 
powerful nations, 11 its jurisprudential potential will remain truncated. 
2.2. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, NON-PROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT. 
The issues surrounding nuclear deterrence strategies, the reg1me of nuclear non-
proliferation, and comprehensive nuclear disarmament can be condensed to form a single 
discourse - that which was placed before the Court in the present Opinion by the opposing 
claims of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States. 
The dispute, examined extensively in Chapters II, Ill and IV, may be summarised as a 
fundamental disagreement between the two sides about the legitimacy of discriminatory 
approaches towards a type of weapon which confers immense powers and responsibilities on 
its manipulators, and incalculable danger on all States. 
Essentially, those States which possess nuclear weapons have arrogated to 
themselves the right to continue lawfully to do so (and have expressed an intention to usc 
them, at any time, in self-defence). Other States have agreed not to acquire them, on the 
(I). The majority of other nations (most notably the Soviet Union and its allies) had never accepted the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction. 
(2). The Court had been misused for politit:ai reasons (emphasis added). 
(3). Continued acceptance was contrary to ... the principle of the equal application of the law. 
(4). [Continued acceptance] would endanger the United Stales' vital national interests. 
Lutz, R.E. (1991). Perspectives on the World Court, the United States, and international dispute resolution in a 
changing world. The lntematimwl Lawyer, 25 (3), 675-711. At 678. 
9 Ibid, at p.679. 
10 Cj. Written Statement of the United States of America, June 20, 1995: Part I: Introduction and Summary. The 
Hague: Greffier, International Court of Justice. Loc. cit., Ch. III, at Note 20. 
11 A taxonomy of which includes Japan, the nations of Western Europe and East Asia, as well as the United 
States, its other Western allies and the remaining Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council. 
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understanding that the nuclear weapon States will eventually disarm, but on their own terms, 
and with no specific obligations touching on methods, time-scales or any other 
consideration. 12 
That discrimination, in the form of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 13 took 
the form of a bargain or contract (now tantamount to opinio juris) between the two sides 
which was negotiated under conditions of duress. The overwhelming military strength of the 
five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council served to ensure the 
accession of most members of the international community to a treaty premised on a 
fundamental inequity, and one which can have no rational defence in terms of "the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations", 14 nor indeed international law generally. 
The primary significance of the Opinion is that it has revealed, by its affirmation of 
the application of peremptory norms of general international law to questions of the legality 
of nuclear weapons (of which the principle norm i:-. jus cogens), 15 the insupportable status of 
the NPT, a treaty which has manifestly failed in its principal aims of limiting, and then 
eliminating, nuciear weapons. 
By its implicit recognition that the fundamental humanitarian rules of the 1907 
Hague Convention IV and Regulations, 16 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions 17 and 1977 
Additional Protocols I and !I 18 bcnr attributes approaching jus cogens (in that they are 
"intransgressible principles of customary international law") 19 the Court has effectively 
12 Supra, at Note I, Article): I-VI, which was extended indefinitely at the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference, New York, April, 1995. 
1 ~ 79 U.N.T.S. 161. 
14 Refer to Appendix 2: The Statute of the International Cou~! of Justice, Article 36, para. 2 (a.) confers the 
jurisdiction of the Court in matters concerning the interpretation of treaties, while Article 38, para. I (c.) allows 
the Court to apply "the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations". 
15 Boyle, F.A. (1986). The relevance of international law to the "paradox" of nuclear deterrence. 80 Nw. U.L. 
Rev.6{1986).1407-1448,at 1447. 
16 U.K.T.S. 6 (1971), Cmnd. 4575. 
17 75 U.N.T.S. 3; U.K. T.S. 39 (1958), Cmnd. 550. 
18 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Misc. 19 (1977), Cmnd. 6927. 
19 Refer to Chapter IV, Section 3.1.1. Opinion. pant 79. [35 l.L.M. 809 ( 1996)]. Boyle (Loc. cit., at Note 15, at 
1445) has argued persuasively that any interna(ional agreement which purports to create a legal status 
impermissible in intcrnationa! law (since it violates a peremptory norm of international law) is void in 
accordance with Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Cm1vc11tion on tf1c Law of Treaties [ 1155 U.N.T.S. 331]. Article 
53 states: 
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rejected the lawfulness of the doctrine of deterrence, the cornerstone of arguments before it 
contending the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 
Arguably, its finding of non liquet on the question of legality in circumstances of 
extreme self-defence20 has given some comfort to the declared nuclear weapon States, since 
it echoes Article X of the NPT, which gives each State Party the sovereign right to 
"withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country" .Z1 In other words, 
the Court was not prepared to deny the supremacy of national interest over international law. 
Nevertheless, such an outcome is still far removed from an affirmation of such supremacy. 
The only possible justification for the continued existence of a regime of non~ 
proliferation is as a transitional phase in the progress of disarmament.22 Since the NPT has 
failed as an instrument capable of supporting comprehensive disarmament initiatives, its 
discretlit should form the starting point for moves to abandon it as a prerequisite for the 
development of a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention constructed along the lines 
of other Conventions banning weapons of mass destruction.23 
These alternative analyses of the significance of the Opinion lend credence, as 
Andrew Mack asserts,24 to its perception as a two~edged sword. This aspect of the decision is 
most vulnerable to interpretation as the inevitable result of extra-judicial influence, 
A trcnty is void if, nt the time of its conclusion, it connicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the internutionnl community of States 
ns a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which cnn be modified only 
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 
It is submitted that, even had the Court chosen not to characterise the fundillnental tenets of humanitarian law in 
unncd connie! as amounting to jus coge11s (as it did at pam 79 of the Opinion), such rules would still now carry 
that attribute as customary intcrnationul law. Thus, the NPT cannot escape nullity on the grounds of 
retrospcctivity. 
20 Loc. cir., supra, at Chapter IV, Section 3.1. Opinion, para. 105 (2) E. 
21 U1c. cil., at Note 13. See also Appendix 3. 
22 Canberra Commission on the Eliminntion of Nuclear weap0ns (1996). Report of the Canberra Commission 
011 the Eliminatiml of Nuclear weapons. Canherru: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trude. At p.l: 
"Statement". 
23 The 1972 Convellfion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons [ 1015 U.N. T.S. 163], ami the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convemion [32 l.LM. 
800 (1993)1 provide models for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in terms of their scope, comprehensiveness und 
verification apparatus. See Note 43, infra. 
2
"
1 Mack, A. (1996, July 10). Disarming logic a test for nuclear powers. The Australian, p.!3. 
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especially from the United States. Nevertheless, the absence of strong evidence to that effect 
must work in the Court's favour. 25 
2.3. PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DEFENCE. 
As the thesis has stressed, the nub ~f the Opinion is its penultimate holding that the 
Court could not conclude definitively, given the current state of international law and 
elements of fact before it, whether a State could use nuclear weapons lawfully in defence of 
. . 26 Its very existence. 
This outcome has called into question the relationship between the jus ad bellum 
customary rules governing resort to war, now codified in the United Nations Charter, and the 
humanitarian laws of armed conflict, the modern jus in bello.27 Judge Wecramantry has 
expressed in his Dissenting Opinion the current position of the law as it resolves the blurred 
distinction which the Opinion makes between the two: 
Whatever be the merits or otherwise of resorting to the use of force (the 
province of the jus ad bellum), when once the domain of force is entered, 
the governing law in that domain is the jus in bello. The humanitarian laws 
of war take over and govern all who participate, assailant and victim alike. 
The argument before the Court has proceeded as though, once the self-
defence exception to the use of force comes into operation, the applicability 
of the jus in bello falls away. This supposition is juristically wrong and logi-
25 But note that there are unsubstantiated reports of extra-juridical iniluences on the Court. most substantially 
(and unsurprisingly) from NGOs. Two examples: 
In response to the insistent urgings of the nuclear weapon states (NWS), the Court could have 
used it.~ discretionary power to refuse to consider the case altogether. 
Weiss, P. ( 1996). Notes on a miswulersrood decision: The World Court's near perfect Adl'i.I'OJ)' Opinion in the 
Nuclear weapon Case. Unpublished manuscript, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, 
New York. At p. I. 
More prosaically: 
Tile former President of the Court, Sir Robert Jennings, warned that budget cuts had forced 
the Court typing pool to be closed. He appealed for everyone to usc their influence to protect 
the Court "at this decisiPe moment for this precious creation" (original emphasis). 
World Court Pn~iect U.K. (no date), [Leaflet]. Hailsham. Still waiting for nuclear judgment day: The Court 
under pressure. Author. 
26 Ibid, Note 20. 
27 Refer to Chapter IV, Section 3.1.1. 
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-ca1ly untenable .... The contention that the legality of the use of force justifies 
a breach of humanitarian law is ... a total non-sequitur.28 
This appears, with respect, unequivocally to state lex lata on the question of the 
applicability of humanitarian law to armed conflict. There is no doubt that a State, when 
attacked, may, in the first instance, lawfully defend itself with whatever methods are 
consonant with the rules governing the use of force. It may use those which are necessary, 
and in proportion to those used against it, and even in anticipation of an imminent attack 
upon it.29 
However, it seems impossible to deny the irrelevance of any concept of 
proportionality in the case of a usc of nuclear weapons in self-defence, which, in any event, 
would almost certainly take the form of anticipatory self-defence using a first-strike launch 
of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 
Further, it has been suggested by Brownlie and Singh that Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, concerning measures for immediate self-defence, precludes any resort to 
armed force which does not follow from a previous armed atlack?0 This interpretation 
subordinates the customary law of jus ad bellum to positive conventional law, and renders a 
first-strike nuclear attack in anticipatory self-defence illegal.:n 
The issues surrounding the principles of self-defence as they relate to the use of 
nuclear weapons, of which the above discussion represents only a small part, are of 
surpassing importance in the question put by the U.N. General Assembly: "Is the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?"32 That 
alone required the International Court of Justice carefully to consider, interpret and apply 
28 Dissenting Opinion of Jur.lgc Wccramantry, Part IV. 35 l.L.M. 809 (1996). 
29 The dicta in the Caroline Case, Loc. cit., at Ch. III, Note 32. 
JO Sec Appendix J. I. Brownlie, cited in Pogany, I. (1986). Nuclear weapons and self-defence in intcrnalionnl 
law. 2 Com/. J.l. L. 97, at 108, 109. Singh, N., & Me Whinney, E. (1989). Nuclear weapons and contemporaJ)' 
international law. (2nd rev. ed.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. At p. ]66. It is emphasised here that this 
discussion is not intended to allude to the relevance of reprisal to the case of a nuclear exchange, but takes the 
general position that reprisal, as a principle of internntional law, is largely redundant in that context. 
31 It must be acknowledged that this argument hns its detractors, such as Bowell, who contends that all 
customary rights not inconsistent with those held under the U.N. Charter remain unimpaired. Loc. cit., at Note 
30. 
n Opinion, para. I. Loc. cit., at Note 28. 
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those principles to the wealth of evidence of fact before it, as it delivered its Judgment. Its 
failure to do so is a matter for regret. 
3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, RIGHTS, AND LAW. 
It will be recalled that the thesis has taken as fundamental certain principles 
concerning the nature of international politics and the normative structure of the international 
system; the so-called ''neo-liberal'' approach.33 These were summarised as: 
(a.). Co-operation and complex interdependence between States m all spheres of 
activity. 
(b.). Universal adherence to principles and norms of international behaviour by 
States. 
(c.). The essential role of non-State actors in the international arena. 
These are the attributes of a community of peers whose individual sovereign 
members have relinquished their absolute sovereignty by the fact of their statehood, and the 
rights and obligations they acknowledge as residing in that status.J4 
The United Nations era has seen a rapid growth in the rate of development of the 
system of relations between States. The fifty States of 1945 have today become almost two 
hundred, while conventional international law has multiplied exponentially. The result has 
been that the importance, as well as the quantum, of rights and duties which States mutually 
acknowledge, and which they seek to exercise, has also expanded rapidly. As a consequence, 
33 See Chapter II, Section I: Introduction. 
34 Franck, cited in Peck, C. (1996). The United Nations as a dispute .\'C/1/ement system: improved mechanisms 
for the prevention and resolution of conflict. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. At pp.\64-166. As Franck 
notes: 
Onl:: a few decades ago, international law applied exclusively to States. Today, it is an 
intricate network of laws governing myriad rights and dutie5 that stretch across and 
beyond m1tional boundaries, piercing the statist veil even while sometimes pretending 
thnt nothing has changed. (p.24). 
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the successes and failures of the International Court of Justice as an effective World Court 
have been thrown into sharp relief. 
The cenlral difficulty for the Court is that States are, on the whole, reluctant to 
concede any decision-making control to an external agent, and especially a non-State entity 
such as the Court. One telling statistic is that, by August 1995, only 61 States, less than one-
third of the Member States of the United Nations, had agreed to compulsory jurisdiction 
under the Optional Clause arrangements of Article 36 (2) of the Court's Statute. Of the five 
Permanent Members of the Security Council, only the United Kingdom currently endorses 
them.35 
This reality is ameliorated somewhat by the appearance in the present Opinion of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France, but remains of serious 
concern. 
The most pressing problem for the international community, in this context, is the 
need to seek ways in which the most important judicial component of the United Nations 
Organisation can be incorporated more closely into lhc global system of dispute resolution. 
Ve1y few States are willing to risk the adverse consequences of denying the validity of rules 
of recognition in international law, such as the binding nature of treaty obligations and the 
practices of States. 36 For the rest, such rules are known to obligate States, and to fonn the 
foundation on which rights subsist in international law. The International Court of Justice 
must be the forum of last resort for the resolution of disputes, and for advisory opinions, 
involving the substantive components of those rights. 
The solution of this highly complex problem will involve issues of confidence-
building among States, of the Court's relevance to international relations and law in the 
corning century, of its flexibility in accommodating rapid change, and of its efficiency and 
effectiveness in discharging its duties. 
Most fundamentally, it must be allowed to address solutions to disputes, and render 
Advisory Opinions, in ways which incorporate an overtly political component. As Gordon 
JS Ibid., at Note 34. p.J70. 
36 Although the so-called "outlaw" or "pariah" States, such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq and Iran have been 
accused by Western nations of having done so, routinely, over many years. 
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has observed,37 the Court is, and has always been, much more than simply a com1 of law 
(which, given the nature of international law, it could never be). 
Any perusal of a list of cases decided before the present Court, and its predecessor,38 
will show that, with few exceptions, those cases incorporated issues carrying political or 
diplomatic dimensions.39 The present Opinion is no exception to that truism. Should the 
Court begin to leaven its work in the legal domain with a greater measure of pragmatic 
political reality, it will enhance its ability to assist the development of international law 
which better serves the needs of its subjects. In the final analysis, the public Law of Nations 
is, like politics, the art of the possible. 
4. A FINAL APPRAISAL. 
The Advisory Opinion called by resolution of the United Nations General Assembl/0 
resulted in the most extensive proceedings in the history of the Court. The significance of the 
question, and its subject, served to ensure intense global interest, and wide participation by 
the community of nations. 
The substantive content of the Opinion has created as many legal and political 
questions as it has answered. As Judge Shahabuddeen commented, any legal right of a State 
"to put the planet to death" is surely the most literal and indefensible application of the 
maximjiatjustitia ruat coe/um.41 
What, in fact, impelled the Court to its finding of non liquet? Surely it is a primary 
characteristic of all courts that the law is known to them.42 Again, on what basis has the 
37 Ibid., Note 6. 
~8 TilC Permanent Court of International Justice ( 1922-1940), 
39 Eyffinger, A. (1996). 11w lntemational CDurt of Justice 1946-1996. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
pp. 374-385. 
40 Sec Foreword . 
41 
"Let justice be done, though the heavens fall". Dissenting Opinion, Loc. cit., Ch. IV, at Note 19. Judge 
Shahabuddeen also noted here bis predecessor, Judge Carneiro's, view in the Minquiers and Ecrelws Case. 
(France v. United Kingdom) [I.C.J. Reports !953 p.l09] that " .... no judge nowadays can blindly follow the 
obsolete rulejiatj11stitia, pereat mwtdus", In Shahabuddccn's view, that rule should, undoubtedly, now be ''fiat 
justitia, ne pereat mundus" - "Let justice be done, and the world ttot be endangered". 
42 As embodied in the maxim jura novit curia. One of the Court's most strident critics has stated " .... the Court's 
often Delphic pronouncements warrant the concern of anyone interested in enhancing the inter;rity of 
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Court sought to subordinate the settled humanitarian rules of armed conflict to a nascent 
principle of "State Survival", and what are the components of that principle? These and 
many other uncertainties infuse and surround the Opinion. 
To conclude: the Court had three alternative legal paths on which to travel: 
(a.). It could find that, given the evidence of facts before it, and the current state of 
international law, it was not able to express an opinion on the legality or illegality of nuclear 
weapons when used in exceptional or extreme circumstances. 
(b.). It could find that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was unlawful in all 
circumstance, without exception, on the basis of the universal nature of humanitarian law. 
(c.). It could find that there are circumstances, however limited, in which the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons is lawful. 
Its ambiguous embrace of the first alternative continues the legal uncertainty 
surrounding this greatest of questions. Only a specific convention requiring complete nuclear 
disarmament will remove it.43 
The legal status of the threat or usc of nuclear weapons ought, in fact, to be 
abundantly clear. Nuclear weapons are irretrievably illegal, in all circumstances, in terms of 
international humanitarian law, and their use would constitute a crime against humanity. As 
this thesis has demonstrated, no alternative exists in fact, or in law.44 
international legal communication." Nafziger, J. (1984). The development of international law: obstacles and 
hopes. Australian Owlook, 38. (1), 33-39, at 36. This overstates the case. The arcane and labyrinthine internal 
decision-making processes of the Court, dl:Scribed by Singh, must be a major factor contribming to judgments 
which lack a measure of coherence and lucic.'ity. Singh, N. (1989). The role and record of the lllfernarional 
Court of ltl.l"fice. Dordrecht: Marti nus Nijhoff. At pp. 382-399. 
4J The Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy has drafted u "Model Nuclear Weapons Convention", on the 
basis of a "comprehensive approach" to nuclear disannament, and within a "timebound framework", as called 
for in Resolution 50/70P of the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations. Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear 
Policy (1996). Model nuclear weapons convemion. Unpublished manuscript, L.C.N.P., New York. 
44 The most comprehensive treatise on the question of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons (from a perspective of 
comprehensive illegality) is undoubtable Singh, N. & McWhinney, E. (1989). Nuclear weapons and 
contemporary international law (2nd rev. cd.) Dordrccht: Martinus Nijhoff. 
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Charter of the United Nations 
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which 
justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law ca.n be 
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR 
THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, 
and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance 
of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest, and to employ intemational machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH 
THESE AIMS Accordingly, our respective Governments, through rep1~sentatives assembled in the city 
of San Francisco, who have exhibit·;d their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed 
to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be 
known as the United Nations. 
CHAPTER I 
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
l. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. 
Article 2 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in 
accordance with the following Principles. 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. 
2. All Members, in order to ensure to a of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, 
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shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter. 
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and. justice, are not endangered. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with 
the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United 
Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. 
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in 
accordance with these Principles so far as may be n~cessary for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
CHAPTER II 
MEMBERSHIP 
Article 3 
The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously 
signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in 
accordance with Article ll 0. 
Article 4 
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to a other peace-loving states which accept the 
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and 
willing to carry out these obligations. 
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the Nations will be effected by a decision of the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security CGuncil. 
Article 5 
A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the 
Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and 
privileges may be restored by the Security Council. 
Article 6 
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present 
Charter may be' expelled from the Organization by the General Assem, .; upon the recommendation of 
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the Security Council. 
CHAPTER III 
ORGANS 
Article 7 
l. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security 
Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council. an International Court of Justice, and 
a Secretariat. 
2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present 
Charter. 
Article 8 
The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any 
capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Composition 
Article 9 
1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations. 
2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly. 
Functions and Powers 
Article 10 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present 
Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, 
except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or 
to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters. 
Article 11 
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the 
Security Council or to both. 
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of inter~ national 
peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, 
or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, 
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and. except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to 
the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is 
necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after 
di3cussion. 
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to siluations which are likely to 
endanger international peace and security. 
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Arlicle shall not limit the general scope of 
Article 10. 
Article 12 
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned 
to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to 
that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests. 
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly 
at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are 
being dealt with by the Security Council and similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of 
the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases 
to deal with such matters. 
Article 13 
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: 
a. promoting interntltional co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification; 
b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health 
fields, an assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the Geneml with respect to matters mentioned 
in paragraph ) above are set forth in Chapters TX and X. 
Article 14 
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the 
provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
Article 15 
1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security 
Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided 
upon or taken to main-tain international peace and security. 
2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United 
Nations. 
Article 16 
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The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system 
as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the ap:Jfoval of the trusteeship agreements 
for areas not designated as strategic. 
Article 17 
1. The Genera Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of tile Organization. 
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General 
Assembly. 
3. The Assembly shall consider and approve any finam::ial and budgetary arrangements with specialize 
agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the adntinistrative budgets of such specialized 
agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned. 
Voting 
Article 18 
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two~ thirds majority 
of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non~permanent members of the 
Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of 
members of the Trusteeship Council in accordunce with paragraph l of Article 86, the admission of 
new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the 
expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary 
questions. 
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be 
decided by a two~thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting. 
Article 19 
A Member of the United Nations which is ln arrears in the payment of its fmancial contributions to the 
Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds 
the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly 
may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to 
conditions beyond the of the Member. 
Procedure 
Article 20 
The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion 
may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security 
Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Naticns. 
Article 21 
The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each 
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Article 22 
The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance 
of its functions. 
CHAPTERV 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Composition 
Article 23 
l. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of 
China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist , the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The 
General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members 
of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first in- stance to the contribution of 
Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of inter- national peace and security and to the 
other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the 
first election of the non- permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security 
Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one 
year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election. 
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative. 
Functions and Powers 
Article 24 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the 
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall acl in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge 
of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, Vlfl, and XII. 
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General 
Assembly for its consideration. 
Article 25 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council 
in accordance with the present Charter. 
Article 26 
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In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the 
least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall 
be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in 
Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United-Nations for the establishment cf a 
system for the regulation of armaments. 
Voting 
Article 27 
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine 
member ... 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine 
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under 
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. 
Procedure 
Article 28 
1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of 
the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at times at the seat of the Organization. 
2. The Security Council shall hold meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be 
represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative. 
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in 
its judgment will best facilitate its work. 
Article 29 
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance 
of its functions. 
Article 30 
The Securily Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its 
President. 
Article 31 
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the. Security Council may participate, 
without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter 
considers that the interests of that Member arc specially affected. 
Article 32 
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which 
is not a Member of the United Nations, if il is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security 
Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The 
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is not a Member of the United Nations. 
CHAPTER VI 
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
Article 33 
1. The parties to any dispute, the conr.inuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of a, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies ur arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. 
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by 
such means. 
Article 34 
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or 
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Article 35 
I. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to 
in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. 
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security 
Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the 
purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter. 
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this 
Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles ll and j_2. 
Article 36 
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a 
situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute 
which have already been adopted by the: parties. 
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International 
Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. 
Article 37 
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means 
indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council. 
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2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 
or to recommend such terms of settlement a ... it may consider appropriate. 
Article 38 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if ali the parties to 
any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the 
dispute. 
CHAPTER VII 
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF 
THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION 
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles:!: and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Article 40 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Counctl may, before making the 
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties 
concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such 
provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties 
concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional 
measures. 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or 
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
Article 43 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the mllintenance of international peace 
and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, a...;;sistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
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2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of 
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security 
Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security 
Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
Article 44 
When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented 
on it to provide armed forces in fultilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that 
Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning 
the employment of contingents of lhat Member's armed forces. 
Article 45 
In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately 
available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength 
and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, 
within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the 
Security Council with the assistance of the Military Committee. 
Article 46 
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of 
the Military Staff Committee. 
Article 47 
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on 
questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its dispo~al, the regulation of 
armaments, and possible disarmament. 
2. The Military Staff Committee consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the 
Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently 
represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the 
efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities re- quires lhe participation of that Member its 
work. 
3. The Military Staff Committee be responsible under the Security Council for the strategit Jirection of 
any anned forces paced at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of 
such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the security Council and after consultation 
with appropriate regional agencies, may establish sub-commit- tees. 
Article 48 
1. The a~tion required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of 
them, as the Security Council may determine. 
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2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their 
action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the 
measures decided upon by the Security Council. 
Article 50 
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other 
state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special 
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the 
Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems. 
Article 51 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore. international peace 
and security. 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Article 52 
1. Nothing in the present Charter the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate fur 
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities arc consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies 
shall make every effort to achieve pacific seltlement of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. 
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes 
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states 
concerned or by reference from the Security Council. 
4. This Article in no way the application of Articles 34 and 35. 
Article 53 
l. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for 
enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the 
exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for 
pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on 
the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments 
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concerned, be charged with the responsibility fa~· , >'enting further aggression by such a state. 
2. The term enemy state as used in para- graph I of this Article applies to any state which during the 
Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter. 
Article 54 
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in 
contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
CHAPTER IX 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION 
Article 55 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful 
and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standa:;ds of living, fu employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural 
and educational co- operation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
Article 56 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. 
Article 57 
I. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide 
international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, 
educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 63. 
2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as 
specialized agencies. 
Article 58 
The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of 
the specialized agencies. 
Article 59 
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The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the 
creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55. 
Article 60 
Responsibility for the disl!harge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be 
vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and 
Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X. 
CHAPTER X 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 
Composition 
Article 61 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected 
by the General Assembly. 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council 
shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate 
re-election. 
3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from 
twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members 
whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected. 
Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall expire 
at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with 
arrangements made by the General Assembly. 
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative. 
Functions and Powers 
Article 62 
1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to 
international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make 
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the 
United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned. 
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 
3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters 
falling within its competence. 
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences 
on matters falling within its competence. 
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l. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agteements with any of the agencies re.terred to in 
Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with 
the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly. 
2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and 
recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the 
Members of the United Nations. 
Article 64 
1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular re- ports from the 
specialized agencies. may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the 
specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and 
to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly. 
2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly. 
Article 65 
The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall a'isist the 
Security Council upon its request. 
Article 66 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in 
connexion with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly. 
2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of 
the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies. 
3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be 
assigned to it by the General Assembly. 
Voting 
Article 67 
I. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present 
and voting. 
Procedure 
Article 68 
The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the 
promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may for the performance of its functions. 
Article 69 
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The Economic and Social Council sha11 invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, 
without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member. 
Article 70 
The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized 
agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established 
by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies. 
Article 71 
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for con:;ultation with 
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such 
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned. 
Article 72 
I. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of 
selecting its President. 
2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall 
include provision for the convening of meetings on tile request of a majority of its members. 
CHAPTER XI 
DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES 
Article 73 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of 
territories whose r..eoples have not yet attained a full measur·: of self-government recognize the 
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred 
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well- being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this 
end: 
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, 
and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses; 
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to 
assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement; 
c. to further international peace and security; 
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one 
another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the 
practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and 
e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as 
security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical 
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nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are 
respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and Xlli apply. 
Article 74 
Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this 
Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general 
principle of good-neigh-bourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest 
of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters. 
CHAPTER XII 
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM 
Article 75 
The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the 
administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent 
individual agreements. These territories arc hereinafter referred to as trust territories. 
Article 76 
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations 
laid down in Article I of the present Charter, shall be: 
a. to further international peace and security; 
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the 
trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may 
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement~ 
c. to encourage respect for human rights ami for fundamental freedoms for all with- out : as to race, 
sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the 
world; and 
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United 
Nations and their, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without 
prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80. 
Article 77 
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed 
thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements: 
a. territories now held under mandate; 
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and 
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. 
2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will 
be brought under the trustee~ ship system and upon what terms. 
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Article 78 
The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories IVhich have become Members of the United 
Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality. 
Article 79 
The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any 
alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the 
mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and 
shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85. 
Article 80 
I. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 
.8..1. placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, 
nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of 
any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the 
United Nations may respectively be parties. 
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of 
the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the 
trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77. 
Article 81 
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be 
administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. 
Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the 
Organization itself. 
Article 82 
There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a Mrategic area or areas which may include part 
or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement 
or agreements made under Article 43. 
Article 83 
I. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of 
the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security 
Council. 
2. he basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area. 
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without 
prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perfonn 
those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, 
social, and educational matters in the strategic areas. 
Article 84 
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It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in 
the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make 
use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations 
towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for 
local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory. 
Article 85 
1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not 
designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their 
alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly. 
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the 
General Assembly in carrying out these functions. 
CHAPTER XIII 
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL 
Composition 
Article 86 
l. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations: 
a. those Members administering trust territories; 
b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; 
and 
c. as many other Members elected for three~ year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary 
to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those 
Members of the United Nations which ad~ minister trust territories and those which do not. 
2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent 
it therein. 
Fnnctions and Powers 
Article 87 
The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their 
functions, may; 
a. consider reports submitted by the ad- ministering authority; 
b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority; 
c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the 
administering authority; and 
d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements. 
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Article 88 
The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for 
each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the 
General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire. 
Voting 
Article 89 
l. Each member of the Tmsteeship Council shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and 
voting. 
Procedure 
Article 90 
1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its 
President. 
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its mles, which shall include 
provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members. 
Article 91 
The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and 
Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively 
concerned. 
CHAPTER XIV 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Article 92 
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall 
function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter. 
Article 93 
1. All Members of the United Nations are facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. 
2. A state which is not of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice on to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation 
of the Security Council. 
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Article 94 
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International 
Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. 
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered 
by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may I if it deems 
necessary I make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give to the judgment. 
Article 95 
Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the 
solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which 
may be concluded in the future. 
Article 96 
I. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give 
an advisory opinion on any legal question. 
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so 
authori?ed by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal 
questions arising within the scope of their activities. 
CHAPTER XV 
THE SECRETARIAT 
Article 97 
The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary- General and such staff as the Organization may require. 
The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the 
Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. 
Article 98 
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the 
Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall 
perfonn such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make 
an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization. 
Article 99 
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his 
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Article 100 
I. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any government or from any other authority externa to the Organization. They shall 
refrain from any action which might on their position as international officials responsible only to the 
Organization. 
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2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively inter- national character of 
the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the 
discharge of their responsibilities. 
Article 101 
1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General 
Assembly. 
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a 
part of the Secretariat. 
3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the 
conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, 
and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible. 
CHAPTER XVI 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Article 102 
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations 
after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat 
and published by it. 
2. No party to any such treaty or iiHernalional agreement which has not been registered in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph I of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ 
of the United Nations. 
Article 103 
In the event of a conflict between the obligatiom of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail. 
Article 104 
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes. 
Article 105 
I. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities 
as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. 
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall 
similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their 
functions in connexion with the Organization. 
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3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the 
application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the 
United Nations for this purpose. 
CHAPTER XVII 
TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
Article 106 
Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of 
the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties 
to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion 
requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the 
Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
Article 107 
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during 
the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized 
as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action. 
CHAPTER XVIII 
AMENDMENTS 
Article 108 
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when 
they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United 
Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. 
Article 109 
1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the 
present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the 
General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the 
United Nations shall have one vote in the conference. 
2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take 
effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the 
Members of the United Nations including the permanent members of the Security Council. 
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly 
following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be 
placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so 
decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven 
members of the Security Council. 
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CHAPTER XIX 
RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE 
Article 110 
l. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes. 
2. The shall be deposited with the Government of the Unite States of America, which shall notify a the 
signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secrctary~General of the Organization when he has been 
appointed. 
3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of by the Republic of China, France, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist, the United King- dam of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the deposited shall 
thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate 
copies thereof to all the signa- tory states. 
4. The states signatory to the present Chartar which ratify it after it has come into force will become 
original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications. 
Article 111 
The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally 
authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of ~the United States of America. 
Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other 
signatory states. 
IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the 
present Charter. 
DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and 
forty-five. 
An Electronic Publication of the Avalon Project- William C. Fray and Lisa A. Spar, 
Co-Directors 
Copyright 1996 The Avalon Project 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice 
Article 1 
The International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Statute. 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice 
CHAPTER I 
ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT 
Article 2 
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality 
from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their 
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized 
competence in international law. 
Article 3 
I. The Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state. 
2. A person who for the purposes of membership in the Court could be regarded as a national of more 
than one state shall be deemed to be a national of the one in which he ordinarily exercises civil and 
political rights. 
Article 4 
1. The members of the Court shall be elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council 
from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Pennanent Court of Arbitration, in 
accordance with the following provisions. 
2. In the case of Members of the United Nations not represented in the Permanent C0urt of Arbitration, 
candidates shall be nominated by national groups appointed for this purpose by theii governments 
under the same conditions as those prescribed for members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by 
Article 44 of the Convention of The Hague of 1907 for the pacific settlement of intemational disputes. 
3. The conditions under which a state which is a party to the present Statute but is not a Member of the 
United Nations may participate in electing the members of the Court shall, in the absence of a special 
agreement, be laid down by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council. 
Article 5 
1. At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall address a written request to the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration belonging to the 
states which are parties to the present Statute, and to the members of the national groups appointed 
under Article 4, paragraph 2, inviting them to undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the 
nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court. 
2. No group may nominate more than four persons, not more than two of whom shall be of their own 
nationality. In no case may the number of candidates nominated by a group be more than double the 
number of seats to be filled. 
Article 6 
Before making these nominations, each national group is recommended to consult its highest court of 
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justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national sections of 
international academies devoted to the study of law. 
Article 7 
I. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of a!l the persons thus nominated. 
Save as provided in Article 12, paragraph 2, these shall be the only persons eligible. 
2. The Secretary-General shall su\.J~it this list to the General Assembly and to the Security Council. 
Article 8 
The General Assembly and the Security Council shall proceed independently of one another to elect 
the members of the Court. 
Article 9 
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should 
individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation 
of the main fonns of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured. 
Article 10 
1. Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the 
Security Council shall be considered as elected. 
2. Any vote of the Security Council, whether for the election of r'uges or for the appointment of 
members of the conference envisaged in A11icle 12, shall be taken without any distinction between 
pennanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. 
3. In the event of more than one national of the same state obtaining an absolute majority of the votes 
both of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, the eldest of these only shall be considered 
as elected. 
Article 11 
If, after the first meeting held for the purpose of the election, one or more seats remain to be filled, a 
second and, if necessary, a third meeting shall take place. 
Article 12 
I. If, after the third meeting, one or more seats still remain unfilled, a joint conference consisting of si::. 
members, three appointed by the General Assembly and three by the Security Council, may be formed 
at any time at the request of either the General Assembly or the Security Council, for the purpose of 
choosing by the vote of an absolute majority one name for each seat still vacant, to submit to the 
General Assembly and the Security Council for their respective acceptance. 
2. If the joint conference is unanimously agreed upon any person who fulfills the required conditions, 
he may be included in its list, even though he was not included in the list of nominations referred to in 
Article 7. 
3. If the joint conference is satisfied that it will not be successful in procuring an election, those 
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members of the Court who have already been elected shall, within a period to be fixed by the Security 
Council, proceed to fill the vacant seats by selection from among those candidates who have obtained 
votes either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. 
4. In the event of an equality of votes among the judges, the eldest judge shall have a casting vote. 
Article 13 
1. The members of the Court shall be elected for nine years and may be re-elected; provided, however, 
that of the judges elected at the first election, the terms of five judecs shall expire at the end of three 
years and the terms of five more judges shall expire at the end of six years. 
2. The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the above-mentioned initial periods of three and 
six years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the Secretary-General immediately after the first 
election has been completed. 
3. The members of the Court shall continue to discharge their duties until their places have been filJed. 
Though replaced, they shall finish any cases which they may have begun. 
4. In the case of the resignation of a member of the Court, the resignation shall be addressed to the 
President of the Court for transmission to the Secretary-General. This last notification makes the place 
vacant. 
Article 14 
Vacancies shall be filled by the same method as that laid down for the first election subject to the 
following provision: the Secretary-General shall, within one month of the occurrence of the vacancy, 
proceed to issue the invitations provided for in Article 5, and the date of the electior, shall be fixed by 
the Security Council. 
Article 15 
A member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of office has not expired shall hold 
office for the remainder of his predecessor's tenn. 
Article 16 
I. No member of the Comt may exercise any political or administrative function, or engage in any 
other occupation of a professional nature. 
2. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 
Article 17 
l. No member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case. 
2. No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part as 
agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or 
of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity. 
3. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 
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Article 18 
1. No member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, 
he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions. 
2. Formal notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General by the Registrar. 
3. This notification makes the place vacant. 
Article 19 
The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic 
privileges and immunities. 
Article 20 
Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court 
that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously. 
Article 21 
1. The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for three years; they may be re-elected. 
2. The Court shall appoint its Registrar and may provide for the appointment of such other officers as 
may be necessary. 
Article 22 
I. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague. This, however, shall not prevent the Court 
from sitting and exercising its functions elsewhere whenever the Court considers it desirable. 
2. The President and the Registrar shall reside at the seat of the Court. 
Article 23 
1. The Court shall remain permanently in session, except during the judicial vacations, the dates and 
duration of which shall be fixed by the Court. 
2. Members of the Court ar~ entitled to periodic leave, the dates and duration of which shall be fixed 
by the Court, having in mind the distance between The Hague and the home of each judge. 
3. Members of the Court shall be bound, unless they are on leave or prevented from attending by 
illness or other serious reasons duly explained to the President, to hold themselves pennanently at the 
disposal of the Court. 
Article 24 
I. If, for some special reason, a member of the Court considers that he should not take part in the 
decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President. 
2. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of the Court should not 
sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly. 
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3. If in any such case the member Court and the President disagree, the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court. 
Article 25 
1. The full Court shall sit except when it is expressly provided otherwise in the present Statute. 
2. Subject to the condition that the number of judges available to constitute the Court is not thereby 
reduced below eleven, the Rules of the Court may provide for allowing one or more judges, according 
to circumstances and in rotation, to be dispensed from sitting. 
3. A quorum of nine judges shall suffice to constitute the Court. 
Article 26 
I. The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges as 
the Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases; for example, labour cases and 
cases relating to transit and communications. 
2. The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of judges 
to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties. 
3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the chambers provided for in this article if the parties so 
request. 
Article 27 
A judgment given by any of the chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 simi I be considered as 
rendered by the Court. 
Article 28 
The chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 may, with the consent of the parties, sit and exercise 
their functions elsewhere than at The Hague. 
Article 29 
With a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Court shall fom1 annually a chamber composed of 
five judges which, at the request of the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure. 
In addition, two judges shall be selected for the purpose of replacing judges who find it impossible to 
sit. 
Article 30 
l. The Court shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of 
procedure. 
2. The Rules of the Court may provide for assessors to sit with the Court or with any of its chambers, 
without the right to vote. 
Article 31 
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I. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the case before the 
Court. 
2. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party 
may choose a person to sit as judge. Such person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons 
who have been nominated as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5. 
3. If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties 
may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article. 
4. The provisions of this Article shall apply to the case of Articles 26 and 29. In such cases, the 
President shall request one or, if necessary, two of the meP.<ters of the Court forming the chamber to 
give place to the members of the Court of the nationality of the parties concerned, and, failing such, or 
if they are unable to be present, to the judges specially chosen by the parties. 
5. Should there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for the purpose of the preceding 
provisions, be reckoned as one party only. Any doubt upon this point shall be seltled by the decision of 
the Court. 
6. Judges chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this Article shall fulfil the conditions 
required by Articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20, and 24 of the present Statute. They shall take part in the 
decision on terms of complete equality with their colleagues. 
Article 32 
I. Each member of the Court shall receive an annual salary. 
2. The President shall receive a special annual allowance. 
3. The Vice-President shall receive a special allowance for every day on which he acts as President. 
4. The judges chosen under Article 31, other than members of the Court, shall receive compensation 
for each day on which they exercise their functions. 
5. These salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be fixed by the General Assembly. They may not 
be decreased during the term of office. 
6. The salary of the Registrar shall be fixed by the General Assembly on the proposal of the Court. 
7. Regulations made by the General Assembly ~hall ftx the conditions under which retirement pensions 
may be given to members of the Court and to the Registrar, and the conditions under which members 
of the Court and the Registrar shall have their travelling expenses refunded. 
8. The above salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be free of all taxation. 
Article 33 
The expenses of the Court shall be borne by the United Nations in such a manner as shall be decided 
by the General Assembly. 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice 
CHAPTER II 
COMPETENCE OF THE COURT 
Article 34 
I. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. 
2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international 
organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by 
such organizations on their own initiative. 
3. Whenever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public international organization or of 
an international convention adopted thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar 
shall so notify the public international organization concemed and shall communicate to it copies of all 
the written proceedings. 
Article 35 
I. The' Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute. 
2. The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special 
provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such 
conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court. 
3. When a state which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the Court shall fix the 
amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. This provision shall not 
apply if such state is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court. 
Article 36 
l. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially 
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory 
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, 
the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law; 
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation; 
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on 
the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time. 
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretaty-General of the United Nations, who shall 
transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 
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5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be 
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which 
they still have to run and in accordru ; with their terms. 
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court. 
Article 37 
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been 
instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, 
as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice. 
Article 38 
I. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting states: 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the b~neral principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59,judicia1 decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the 
parties agree thereto. 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice 
CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURE 
Article 39 
I. The official languages of the Court shall be French and English. If the parties agree that the case 
shall be conducted in French, the judgment shall be delivered in French. If the parties agree that the 
case shall be conducted in English, the judgment shall be delivered in English. 
2. In the absence of an agreement as to which language shall be employed, each party may, in the 
pleadings, use the language which it prefers~ the decision of the Court shall be given in French and 
English. In this case the Court shall at the same time determine which of the two texts shall be 
considered as authoritative. 
3. The Court shall, at the request of any party, authorize a language other than French or English to be 
used by that party. 
Article 40 
I. Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special 
agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the 
dispute and the parties shall be indicated. 
2. The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the application to all concerned. 
3. He shall also notify the Members of the United Nations through the Secretary-General, and also any 
other states entitled to appear before the Court. 
Article 41 
I. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any 
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties 
and to the Security Council 
Article 42 
I. The parties shall be represented by agents. 
2. They may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court. 
3. The agents, counsel, and advocates of parties before the Court shall enjoy the privileges and 
immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties. 
Article 43 
1. The procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral. 
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2. The written proceedings shall consist of the communication to the Court and to the parties of 
memorials, counter-memorials and, if necessary, replies; also all papers and documents in support. 
3. These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in the order and within the time fixed by 
the Court. 
4. A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be communicated to the other party. 
5. The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents, counsel, 
and advocates. 
Article 44 
1. For the service of all notices upon persons other than the agents, counsel, and advocates, the Court 
shall apply direct to the government of the state upon whose territory the notice has to be served. 
2. The same provision shall apply whenever steps are to be taken to procure evidence on the spot. 
Article 45 
The hearing shall be under the control of the President or, if he is unable to preside, of the 
Vice-President; if neither is able to preside, the senior judge present shall preside. 
Article 46 
The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide otherwise, or unless the parties 
demand that the public be not admitted . 
Article 47 
1. Minutes shall be made at each hearing and signed by the Registrar and the President. 
2. These minutes alone shall be authentic. 
Article 48 
The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each 
party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence. 
Article 49 
The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any document or to 
supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal. 
Article 50 
The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization 
that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an cxnert opinion. 
Article 51 
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During the hearing any relevant questions are to be put to the witnesses and experts under the 
conditions laid down by the Court in the rules of procedure referred to in Article 30. 
Article 52 
After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the time specified for the purpose, it may 
refuse to accept any further oral or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the 
other side consents. 
Article 53 
1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other 
party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim. 
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with 
Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law. 
Article 54 
I. When, subject to the control of the Court, the agents, counsel, and advocates have completed their 
presentation of the case, the President shall declare the hearing closed. 
2. The Court shall withdraw to consider the judgment. 
3. The deliberations of the Court shall take place in private and remain secret. 
Article 55 
1. All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges present. 
2. In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge who acts in his place shall have a 
casting vote. 
Article 56 
1. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based. 
2. It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the decision. 
Article 57 
If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge 
shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. 
Article 58 
The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the Registrar. It shall be read in open court, due 
notice having been given to the agents. 
Article 59 
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
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particular case. 
Article 60 
The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the 
judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party. 
Article 61 
1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of 
some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, 
unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was 
not due to negligence. 
2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the 
existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, 
and declaring the application admissible on this ground. 
3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits 
proceedings in revision. 
4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new 
fact. 
5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment. 
Article 62 
I. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision 
in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. 
2 It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request. 
Article 63 
1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case are 
parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith. 
2. Every state so notified has the righl to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the 
construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it. 
Arlicle 64 
Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs. 
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Statute of the International Court of Jus! ice 
CHAPTER IV 
ADVISORY OPINIONS 
Article 65 
I. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may 
be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a fequest. 
2. Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the Court by 
means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is 
required, and accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question. 
Article 66 
1. The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to all states entitled 
to appear before the Court. 
2. The Registmr shall also, by means of a special and direct communication, notify any state (~ntitled to 
appear before the Court or international organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be 
sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will 
be prepared to receive, within a time limit to be hxed by the President, written statements, or to hear, at 
a public sitting to be held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question. 
3. Should any such state entitled to appear before the Court have failed to receive the special 
communication referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, such state may express a desire to submit a 
written statement or to be heard; and the Court will decide. 
4. States and organizations having presented written or oral statements or both shall be permitted to 
comment on the statements made by other states or organizations in the form, to the extent, and within 
the time limits which the Court, or, should it not be sitting, the President, shall decide in each 
particular case. Accordingly, the Registrar shall in due time communicate any such written statements 
to states and organizations having submitted similar statements. 
Article 67 
The Court shall deliver its advisory opinions in open court, notice having been given to the 
Secretary-General and to the representatives of Members of the United Nations, of other states and of 
international organizations immediately concerned. 
Article 68 
In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the 
present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be 
applicable. 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice 
CHAPTERV 
AMENDMENT 
Article 69 
Amendments to the present Statute shall be effected by the same procedure as is provided by the 
Charter of the United Nations for amendments to that Charter, subject however to any provisions 
which the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council may adopt concerning the 
participation of states which are parties to the present Statute but are not Members of the United 
Nations. 
Article 70 
The Court shall have power to propose such amendments to the present Statute as it may deem 
necessary, through written communications to the Secretary~Gcneral, for consideration in conformity 
with the provisions of Article 69. 
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APPENDIX3 
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION .OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
1 JULY 1968 
[79 U.N.T.S. 161) 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
I July !968. 79 U.N.T.S. 161. 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 'Parties to the Treaty,' 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war 
and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take 
measures to safeguard the security of peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the 
danger of nuclear war, 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for 
the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear 
weapons, 
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
Expressing their support for research, devel( . 'llent and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable 
materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear 
technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-
weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for 
peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-
weapon States, 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute 
alone or in co-operation ;vith other States to, the further development of the applications of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, 
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning 
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to 
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and 
to continue negotiations to this end, 
Desiring to further the casing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the 
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of 
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any St<1te, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international 
peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's 
human and economic resources, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, 
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive 
devices. 
ARTICLE II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or 
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. 
ARTICLE III 
I. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Patty to the Treaty undertakes to accept 
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the 
fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of 
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nudear explosive devices. 
Procedure.s for the sufeguards required by this Article shall be followed by with respect to 
source or special fissionable !llaterial whether it is being produced, processed or used in any 
principle wJclear facility or is outside such facility. The safeguards required by this Article 
shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities 
within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
anywhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable materials, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject 
to the safeguards required by this A1ticle. 
3. The safeguards required by this Article sha!I be implemented in a manner designed 
to comply with Article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international cowoperation in the field of peaceful 
nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for 
the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble 
of the Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclearwweapon States Party to the Treaty sha!I conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days 
from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instrument of 
ratification or accession after the I 80-day period, negotiation of such agreement shall 
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not 
later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of such negotiations. 
ARTICLE IV 
I. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all 
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this 
Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate 
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do 
so shall also cowoperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international 
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, especially in the territories of nonwnuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, with 
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 
ARTICLEV 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in 
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through 
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to nonwnuclear weapon States Patty to the Treaty 
on a non~discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices 
used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non~ 
nuclearwweapon. States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a 
special internatiom.l agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body 
with adequate representation of nonwnuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject 
shall as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclearwweapon States Party 
to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
ARTICLE VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control. 
ARTICLE VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in 
order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. 
ARTICLE VIII 
I. Any party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any 
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall 
circulate it to all Parties to the treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more 
of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to 
which they shall invite a lithe Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all 
the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all the nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of 
the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall 
enter force for each P,trty that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon 
the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the 
instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other 
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, arc members of the Board of 
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force 
for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the 
Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty 
with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty 
are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 
may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect with the Depositary Governments, the 
convening of further conferences wilh the same objective of reviewing the operation of the 
Treaty. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign 
the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may 
accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall he subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated Depositary 
Goven1ments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force afler its ratification by the States, the 
Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States 
signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes 
of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent 
to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their 
instrument of ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly infonn all signatory and acceding 
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or 
accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests 
for convening a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 
l 02 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw 
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three 
months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it 
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the 
Parties to the Treaty. 
ARTICLE XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified 
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments 
of the signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of 
July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight. 
